Entrepreneurship Network and Microfinance

Main Article Content

Mohsen Rezaei Mirghaed
Hasan Daliri
Hojatollah Hashem Beigi
صندلی اداری

Abstract

Banks and financial intermediaries, as the highways of financing and absorption of savings, are considered as the key players in promotion of welfare level in each society. In Iran, due to structural deficiencies and international sanctions, a revision of banking industry seems very essential. More specifically, via balancing of financial intermediaries (based on the notion of “resilient economy’s five-year vision coined by the supreme leader of Islamic Revolution in Iran), banks could be used as a tool for economic promotion as well as one of the basic means of resilient economy. This study introduces the structure of the banking industry in Iran and demonstrates its deficiencies. In this respect, a plan for the structure of financial intermediaries is suggested for three purposes: facilitation of financing, reduction of transaction costs, and enhancement of the welfare level in society. In this regard, a structure based on the entrepreneurial networks through utilizing of measurement, consultancy, and monitoring systems is planned in this study. Furthermore, this study seeks to reduce the credit default risk through increasing of the micro-insurance share to the traditional systems of the financing.

Downloads

Download data is not yet available.

Article Details

Section
Articles

References

ADAMS, D. W. (1984) Are the arguments for cheap agricultural credit sound? In Dale W Adams, Douglas H. Graham, and J. D. von Pischke, eds., Undermining Rural Development with Cheap Credit. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

AKBARI, P.; DARABI, A. (2015) Factors Affecting Customer Satisfaction, Quality Banking Services to Iran, Using the Servqual Model Case Study: Resalat Bank of Kermanshah Province. Advanced Social Humanities and Management, v. 1, n. 4.

ALEEM, I. (1990) Imperfect information, screening, and the costs of informal lending: A study of a rural credit market in Pakistan. World Bank Economic Review v. 4, n. 3, p. 329–349.

BASLEY, T. C. S.; LOURY, G. (1993) The Economics of Rotating Savings and Credit Associations. American Economic Review, v. 83, n. 4, p. 792-810.

BASLEY, T. C. S.; LOURY, G. (1994) Rotating Savings and Credit Associations, Credit Markets and Efficiency. Review of Economic Studies v. 61, n. 4, p. 701-719.

BASU, K. (1997) Analytical Development Economics: The Less Developed Economy Revisited. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

BOSE, P. (1998) Formal-informal sector interaction in rural credit markets. Journal of Development Economics n. 56, p. 256–280.

BOTTOMLEY, A. (1975) Interest rate determination in underdeveloped areas. American Journal of Agricultural Economics v. 57, n. 2, p. 279–291.

BOUMAN, F. J. A. (1977) Indigenous savings and credit societies in the developing world. Savings and Development v. 1, n. 4, p. 181–214.

BOUMAN, F. J. A. (1995) Rotating and Accumulating Savings and Credit Associations: A Development Perspective. World Development, v. 23, n. 3, p. 371-384.

BOUMAN, F. J. A. (1983) Indigenous savings and credit societies in the developing world in Von Pischke, Adams and Donald (eds.) Rural Financial Markets in the Developing World World Bank, Washington.

BRAYERMAN, A.; GUASCH, L. (1986) Rural credit markets and institutions in developing countries: Lessons for policy analysis from practice and modern theory. World Development v. 14, n. 10/11, October/November, p. 1253–1267.

CHAMI, R.; FISCHER, J. H. (1995) Community Banking, Monitoring, and the Clinton Plan, Cato Journal, v. 14, n. 3, p. 1-13.

CHURCHILL, C. (2006) Protecting the Poor: A Microinsurance Compendium, ILO, ISBN: 978-92-2-125744-8.

CHURCHILL, C. (1999) Client-Focused Lending: The Art of Individual Lending. Toronto: Calmeadow.

DE AGHION, B. A. (1999) On the design of a credit agreement with peer monitoring. Journal of development economics v. 60, n. 1, p. 79-104.

DE AGHION, D.; ARMENDARIZ, B.; GOLLIER, C. (2000) Peer group formation in an adverse selection model. The Economic Journal, v. 110, n. 46, p. 632-643.

DERCON, S.; HODDINOTT, J.; WOLDEHANNA, T. (2005) Shocks and consumption in 15 Ethiopian villages, Journal of African Economies, 1999-2004.

DEUTCH, E.; TOMANN, H. (1995) Home Ownership in Austria and Germany. Real Estate Economics v. 23, n. 4, p. 441-474.

FLORO, M.; RAY, D. (1997) Vertical links between formal and informal financial institutions. Review of Development Economics v. 1, n. 1, p. 34–56.

GHATAK, M. (1999) Group lending, local information and peer selection. Journal of development Economics, v. 60, n. 1, p. 27-50.

GHOSH, P.; RAY, D. (1999) Information and repeated interaction: Application to informal credit markets. Boston University mimeo

GOETZ, A. M.; GUPTA, R. S. (1996) Who takes the credit? Gender, power, and control over loan use in rural credit programs in Bangladesh. World Development v. 24, n. 1, p. 45–63.

GUERRERO, M.; URBANO, D.; SALAMZADEH, A. (2014) Evolving Entrepreneurial Universities: Experiences and challenges in the Middle Eastern context. in FAYOLLE, A.; REDFORD, D. T. (2014) Handbook of Research in Entrepreneurship Education: Entrepreneurial University Handbook Volume 4 Cambridge: Edward Elgar Publishing.

HOFF, K.; STIGLITZ, J. (1998) Moneylenders and bankers: Price increasing subsidies in a monopolistically competitive market. Journal of Development Economics, v. 55, n. 2, p. 485–518.

HOSSAIN, Mahabub. (1988) Credit for Alleviation of Rural Poverty: The Grameen Bank of Bangladesh. Institute Research Report 65, February. Washington, DC: International Food Policy Research.

HULME, D.; MOSELY, P. (1997) Finance for the poor or the poorest? Financial innovation, poverty and vulnerability. In Geoffrey Wood and Iffath Sharif, eds., Who Needs Credit? Poverty and Finance in Bangladesh. London: Zed Books, and Dhaka: University Press Ltd.

JAFARI MOGHADAM, S.; SALAMZADEH, A. (2016) Do Senior Bankers Care about Entrepreneurial Behavior? Case of Senior Managers of the Iranian Vanguard Banks. World Review of Entrepreneurship, Management and Sustainable Development, 12, Forthcoming.

JAFARI MOGHADAM, S.; SALAMZADEH, A.; YOUSEFIYAR, A. (2014) Factors Affecting Senior Managers’ Entrepreneurial Behavior in Iranian Pioneer Banks. In Proceedings of the International Conference on Entrepreneurship, (ICE 2014), Tehran, Iran.

LAFFONT, J. J.; N’GUESSAN, T. T. (2000) Group lending with adverse selection. European Economic Review n. 44, p. 773–784.

LAFFONT, J. J.; REY, P. (2003) Moral hazard, collusion and group lending. IDEI Working Paper 122.

LEVENSON, A.; BESLEY, T. (1996) The anatomy of an informal fi nancial market: Rosca participation in Taiwan. Journal of Development Economics v. 51, p. 45–68.

MARKOVIC, M. R.; SALAMZADEH, A. (2012) The Nature of Entrepreneurship: Entrepreneurs and Entrepreneurial Activities. Germany: LAP LAMBERT Academic Publishing.

MASHOOF, H.; MESHKANI, F. (2014) Strategic positioning in banking industry: Evidence from banking industry. Management Science Letters, v. 4, n. 8, p. 1715-1724.

MOHAMMIDI, A. (Ed.). (2013) Iran encountering globalization: problems and prospects. Routledge.

MOTEVASELI, M.; AGHA BABAIE, R. (2008) Investigating the Key Success Factors of Microfinance Institutions by Analyzing Their Characteristics. Economic Research n. 43, p. 225-267.

PESQUEUX, Y. (2013) Network and Entrepreneurship. Encyclopedia of Creativity, Invention, Innovation and Entrepreneurship, p. 1354-1358.

PRINZ, M. (2002) German rural cooperatives, Friedrich-Wilhelm Raiffeisen and the organization of trust 1850–1914. In XIII IEHA Congress Paper Buenos Aires, Session v. 57.

PULLEY, R. V. (1989) Making the poor creditworthy: a case study of the Integrated Rural Development Program in India, India: New Delhi n. 58.

RAHMAN, A. (1999) Microcredit initiatives for equitable and sustainable development: Who pays? World Development v. 26, n. 12, p. 67–82.

RAI, A.; SJÖSTRÖM, T. (2004) Is Grameen lending effcient? Repayment incentives and insurance in village economies. Review of Economic Studies v. 71, n. 1, p. 217–234.

ROBINSON, M. (2001) The Microfi nance Revolution: Sustainable Banking for the Poor. Washington, DC: The World Bank.

SALAMZADEH, A.; KESIM, H. K. (2015) Startup Companies: Life Cycle and Challenges. In Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Employment, Education and Entrepreneurship (EEE), Belgrade, Serbia.

SCHOLTEN, U. (2000) Rotating Savings and Credit Associations in Developed Countries: The German–Austrian Bausparkassen, Journal of Comparative Economics, v. 28, n. 2, p. 340-363.

SHANMUGAM, B. (1989) Development Strategy and Mobilising Savings through ROSCAs: The Case of Malaysia, Savings and Development, 4, XIII, p. 351-68.

SIAMWALLA, A.; PINTHONG, C.; POAPONGSAKORN, N.; SATSANGUAN, P.; NETTAYARAK, P.; MINGMANEENAKIN, W.; TUBPUN, Y. (1990) The Thai rural credit system and elements of a theory: Public subsidies, private information, and segmented markets. World Bank Economic Review v. 4, n. 3, p. 271–296.

SINGH, K. (1968) Structure of interest rates on consumption loans in an Indian village. Asian Economic Review v. 10, n. 4, p. 471–475.

STIGLITZ, J. E. (1990) Peer monitoring and credit markets. World Bank Economic Review v. 4, n. 3, p. 351–366.

STIGLITZ, J. E.; WEISS, A. (1981) Credit markets with imperfect information. American Economic Review v. 71, p. 393–410.

WOOLCOCK, M. (1998) Social Theory, Development Policy, and Poverty Alleviation: A Comparative-Historical Analysis of Group-Based Banking in Developing Economies. Ph.D. diss., Department of Sociology, Brown University.

ZEITINGER, C-P. (1996) Micro-lending in the Russian Federation.” In: LEVITSKY, J. (ed.), Small Business in Transition Economies, 85–94. London: IDTG Publishing. Reprinted in the Quarterly Journal of International Agriculture v. 42, n. 2003, p. 371–383.

فروشگاه اینترنتی