Oleh Pasko
Sumy National Agrarian University, Ukraine
E-mail: paskooleg55@gmail.com
Oksana Melnychuk
State Agrarian and Engineering University in Podilya, Ukraine
E-mail: xcena.melnychuk@gmail.com
Tetiana Bilyk
State Agrarian and Engineering University in Podilya, Ukraine
E-mail: tanyabilyk12@gmail.com
Submission: 24/11/2018
Revision: 08/02/2019
Accept: 28/02/2019
ABSTRACT
The
study aimed to identify the presence / absence of ownership concentration in
agro-industrial companies in Ukraine and to investigate the possible impact of
these processes on the economic performance of companies. We have proven that
there is a significant level of ownership concentration among analyzed
companies in both groups UX and UA. Although there are exceptions, there is a
general tendency to hold a large share of equity instruments by the founders or
major owners. We describe this phenomenon through a twin agency problem,
arguing that such a large share of power concentration serves as a substitute
for a weak environment for protecting investor rights. Concentration of
property is the bulwark from unwanted interventions from both third parties and
from state rulers. The study has found no significant relationship between
ownership concentration and several indicators used as proxy for economic
performance, namely Net cash flow, EBIDTA, Profit/loss before tax, Tobin’s Q.
Our findings indicate that concentration of ownership does not affect the
economic performance of analysed companies, regardless of whether we take for
the analysis the accounting indicators (Profit) or market-based indicators
(Tobin’s Q).
Keywords:
Equity ownership; Ownership concentration;
Corporate governance; Tobin’s Q
1. INTRODUCTION
The
ownership structure is seen as one of the most important mechanisms of
corporate governance, and it becomes particularly important in conditions characterized
by a high degree of ownership concentration (ÁVILA;
ROCHA; DA SILVA, 2015; CONNELLY, et al., 2010; DEMSETZ; VILLALONGA, 2001;
FACCIO; LANG, 2002; FILATOTCHEV, et al., 2007; HOLDERNESS, 2017; ILHAN-NAS, et
al., 2018; KALEZIĆ, 2015; LA PORTA; LOPEZ-DE-SILANES; SHLEIFER, 1999; LEPORE,
et al., 2017; MUGOBO; MUTIZE; ASPELING, 2016; SHLEIFER; VISHNY, 1986; SINGLA;
GEORGE; VELIYATH, 2017; STULZ, 2005; SURESHA; RAVIKUMAR, 2018; THOMSEN;
PEDERSEN, 2000; VEGA SALAS; DENG, 2017).
Recently,
we witnessed a surge in research from all over the world that are increasingly
investigating the impact of ownership structure on the performance of
corporations (ÁVILA,
et al., 2015; ILHAN-NAS, et al., 2018; KALEZIĆ, 2015; MUGOBO, et al., 2016). A number of
those researchers have identified that in many jurisdictions around the world
ownership is concentrated (sometimes highly concentrated) in the hands of few -
one or more large shareholders (BARCA;
BECHT, 2002; LA PORTA, et al., 1999; MAURY; PAJUSTE, 2005).
It
should be noted though that traditionally it has been thought that the agency
problem is predominantly concentrated on the relationship between managers and
dispersed shareholders (BERLE;
MEANS, 1991).
However these researches focus attention on the ever growing role of another
aspect of the agency problem, namely the conflict between large controlling
shareholders and minority shareholders (JENSEN;
MECKLING, 1976; SHLEIFER; VISHNY, 1986; STULZ, 2005) and large
controlling shareholders and state rulers (STULZ,
2005).
It is
also necessary to emphasize the dynamic aspect of the problem, since the
distribution of power within the ownership structure is not static, for large
shareholders constantly clash and compete with each other and with other
investors and authorities for gaining control, forming a ruling coalition and
obtaining maximum private benefits from corporation (BENNEDSEN;
WOLFENZON, 2000; BOLTON; VON THADDEN, 1998; MAURY; PAJUSTE, 2005; PAGANO;
RÖELL, 1998; SELZNICK, 2007; WINTON, 1993; ZWIEBEL, 1995) .
The
role of the largest shareholders is reported to be vital on account of the
concentration of influence in their hands may have the unintended implications
on the company's performance (BENNEDSEN;
WOLFENZON, 2000; BOLTON; VON THADDEN, 1998; CLAESSENS, et at., 2002; CONNELLY,
et al., 2010).
It is
stressed that if large shareholders control the management or controlling
owners they can restrain and discourage their opportunistic conduct and thereby
be of help to minority shareholders (SHLEIFER;
VISHNY, 1986, SHLEIFER; VISHNY, 1997). Even so, the
number of lines of conduct for large shareholders is, of course, not limited to
this, as they can also pursue their own interests, which may differ
significantly from those of other shareholders, and in this way, in effect,
expropriate their wealth (BARCA;
BECHT, 2002; BURKART; PANUNZI; SHLEIFER, 2003; SHLEIFER; VISHNY, 1997).
So,
the issue of concentration and dispersion of companies’ ownership is of great
significance in terms of the impact it has on corporate governance and the
performance of companies (FILATOTCHEV,
et al., 2007; SHLEIFER; VISHNY, 1986; THOMSEN; PEDERSEN, 2000).
The
issue of ownership concentration, however, is multifaceted and is not exhausted
only with abovementioned reasoning as it can be explained from different
standpoints, depending on the stance of the person who writes about it.
The
concentration of property as we have already ascertained has a significant
impact on the results of companies. Given that the question arises - why
ownership tends to concentrate, what are incentives behind that process?
There
is a consensus among researchers that ownership concentration is closely
associated with the protection of investors' rights in each specific
jurisdiction, and in this case, property concentration is seen as a way to
shield business against unlawful attempts to take over the business from the
outside forces (DELL’ACQUA,
et al., 2018; LARDON; BEUSELINCK; DELOOF, 2018; PINDADO; REQUEJO; DE LA TORRE,
2014; J. ZHOU; LAN, 2018; JING ZHOU; TAM; LAN, 2015)
There
is prevalence of the belief in the overwhelming majority of sources that
concentrated property is associated with an unsatisfactory level of legal
protection for investors, indicating that the concentration of ownership and
the protection of investors are in fact interdependent and concentration of
ownership is substitute for investor protection mechanism in jurisdictions
there the latter is fledgling, weak or absent (BURKART,
et al., 2003; CASTILLO; SKAPERDAS, 2005; ILHAN-NAS, et al., 2018; LA PORTA, et
al., 1999; SHLEIFER; WOLFENZON, 2002; WU; XU; YUAN, 2009).
However,
some researchers also suggest another assumption that the concentration of
ownership and legal protection of shareholders are not necessarily
substitutable but complementary ones (BURKART; PANUNZI, 2006; CASELLI; DI
GIULI, 2010; DELL’ACQUA, et al., 2018; LARDON, et al., 2018; LEPORE, et al.,
2017).
La
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny adduce several arguments on why
the concentration of ownership occurs (1998). First of all,
shareholders need more capital in order to exercise control over their managers
and thereby avoid expropriation by them. Secondly, when minority shareholders
are poorly protected, they are ready to acquire corporate rights only at such
low prices, which corporations considering unattractive for issuing new shares.
Thus
low demand for corporate shares by minority shareholders indirectly stimulates
concentration of ownership (LA
PORTA, et al., 1998, p. 1445). La Porta et
al. conclude that “with poor investor protection, ownership concentration
becomes a substitute for legal protection, because only large shareholders can
hope to receive a return on their investment” (LA
PORTA, et al., 1998, p. 1445).
Another
important aspect warrants consideration is the dynamics of ownership change.
Today, many developing countries are trying to emulate the governing structures
and governance mechanism of the United States and other developed countries,
but the results of such changes have not yet been fully explored (WU,
et al., 2009).
There
is also a dearth of research investigating questions about the types of owners
and the changes in the proportions of concentration depending on owner’s types
used (WU,
et al., 2009, p. 177). For example,
when the owner is a state, then it may have other mechanisms for securing its
property, so it may not rely heavily on the concentration of ownership, on the
contrary, it may try to attract as many minority investors as possible to use
less public funds.
And
finally, the last aspect to which attention should be drawn is that in
countries that were on the side of the ‘evil empire’ (“Reagan,
‘Evil Empire,’ Speech Text,” n.d.) during the Iron
Curtain times, the concentration of power is the result of radical and
disorderly carried out privatization (BOUBAKRI; COSSET; GUEDHAMI, 2005).
To
conclude, the concentration of ownership is seen as an effective internal
mechanism of corporate governance, which often leads to the suppression of
other external corporate governance mechanisms such as financial markets, and
may also lead to a decrease in the efficiency of other jurisdictions such as
the legal system (BOUBAKRI,
et al., 2005; HOLMSTRÖM; TIROLE, 1993) and matters for
firm strategy, innovation, and performance (BHAUMIK;
ESTRIN; MICKIEWICZ, 2017; BHAUMIK, et al., 2017; BOZEC, 2005; DELL’ACQUA, et
al., 2018; DEMSETZ; VILLALONGA, 2001).
The
objects of our study are agro-industrial enterprises of Ukraine, which
encompassed all of the abovementioned traits of corporate governance. Being
part of ‘the evil empire’, Ukraine has been an independent state since 1991,
which began to evolve on the basis of a market economy. However, the wide,
ill-conceived and uncontrolled privatization has led to the property that was
before in private ownership ended up in the hands of few. Even the term
appeared – ‘the red director’, depicting the head of the company, who led it in
the Soviet Union, and continued it after its collapse, often becoming an
official millionaire or billionaire.
After
experiencing a period of sharp and chaotic privatization, which brought the
emergence of a large number of official owners, but a handful of real owners,
Ukraine continued to get used to the new order. Step by step the concentration
of property appeared which was the result of weak legal protection, and lack of
order in the country as a whole. The gradual development and acquisitions of
small enterprises led to the emergence of large agrarian conglomerates, many of
which subsequently went to the stock exchanges in Warsaw and London, to seek
further funding.
Thus,
Ukraine's example includes privatization, a significant concentration of
ownership, and then the formation of a pool of powerful landowners who have
become public companies. Some of these companies then began to liberalize ownership,
disperse property, and some, by contrast, have a significant concentration to
date. All this provides a good case for study the concentration of ownership.
Moreover, to best of our knowledge, this is the first work that combines
such a topic (concentration of ownership) and the object (Ukrainian
agro-industrial companies).
The
article is structured as follows. In the next section we explicate the research
methodology. A brief overview of the twin agency problem is included in the
second section. This is followed by a study of concentration of ownership in
Ukrainian agro industrial companies, both listed abroad and domestically in
Ukraine. The penultimate section devotes to elucidation and discussion of the
relation between ownership concentration and economic performance and the paper
concludes with a discussion.
2. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
Our
methodology (as methodology is a mix theories and methods) predicates on agency
problem, institutional theory, and twin agency problem from the theory’ side
and uses statistical methods (correlation and regression). In our analysis, we
compared the agro industrial companies of Ukraine by dividing them into two
groups: public ones that have significant assets in Ukraine and have, in their
majority, Ukrainian owners, this group of enterprises we conventionally call
group UX.
We
compare this group with a group of domestic companies – named by us group UA.
This part of paper deals with establishing presence / absent of ownership
concentration of analysed companies. But since there are only a handful of
Ukrainian companies on Warsaw stock exchange to form a sample for quantitative
research, we took data for all the agro industrial companies listed on the
Warsaw Stock Exchange. Detailed description of our approach in quantitative
research will be laid down in appropriate subsequent section of paper.
3. THE TWIN AGENCY PROBLEM
As
Stulz (2005) argues high expropriation risks warrants for corporate ownership to
be highly concentrated, which in turn ‘limits economic growth, risk-sharing,
financial development, and the impact of financial globalization’ (2005,
p. 1597).
Thus, the impact of financial globalization is less than it could have been
both for the host and investing parties and as a result of this the two of them
incurring losses.
Stulz
(2005) also believes that if that is the case, corporate insiders (owners of
the majority shares) expropriate external investors as they maximize their own
rather than external investor’s wealth. In doing so, they create what the
author calls the "agent problem of corporate insider discretion".
These private benefits of corporate insiders can take different forms, of
course, from the excessive cost on corporate airplanes to direct or covert
theft.
In
addition, Stulz (2005) believes that public authorities influence this through
the rights that they gave to investors in the corporation and the degree of
protection of these rights, which in turn affects the degree of costs private
investors incur in order to acquire economic benefits from the companies they
control. Consequently, when the cost of allocating economic benefits to private
investors is low, the concentrated property prevails over the dispersed one.
Regarding
the second type of agency problem, Stulz (2005) uses the term
"expropriation by the state" to indicate the actions of statesmen to
improve their welfare by reducing the return on corporate investment. State
rulers can use state power to expropriate investors through a wide range of
activities, from direct confiscation to redistribution of tax burden. This
voluntarism of state rulers when using state power for their own benefit
creates an agent problem that R. Schulz calls "the agency's problem of
state ruler discretion".
The
author rightly notes that when such an agency problem exists, corporations with
professional managers and diffused shareholders are ineffective. The logic
behind it is straightforward and convincing. The dispersed ownership is
ineffective because managers can better reduce the risks of state expropriation
by taking measures when they have greater freedom of action, and when control
over their activities is not as stiff as with diffused ownership model. In this
case, managers become alter ego of the organizations and can easily take
advantage of minority owners (STULZ,
2005).
So
adding those two agency problems we get the concept of a "twin agency
problems", which arises because sovereign states and corporate insiders
pursue their own interests at the expense of foreign investors.
In
other words, there are two trends: 1) controlling investors occupy the company,
acting without regard to minority shareholders, and 2) the government
expropriates the wealth of shareholders, both large and small, which
exacerbates the problem. The author calls the first problem "the agency
problem of corporate insider discretion" the second one – "the agency
problem of state ruler discretion" (STULZ, 2005).
When
such a double agent problem is significant, property dispersion is ineffective
and corporate insiders are forced to hold a significant share in corporations.
As a result, Stulz (2005) believes that concentration of property limits
economic growth, financial development, and the country's ability to take
advantage of financial globalization.
3.1.
Concentration
of ownership in Ukrainian agro industrial companies
In our sample we take 10 public companies (we call this
group UX) listed on foreign stock exchanges (as of today all Ukrainian agro
industrial companies with shares on foreign stock exchanges) and 10 smaller
domestically listed companies (group UA). It should also be emphasized here
that all these companies from group UX are also registered abroad, legally they
are not Ukrainian, but they have the main production sites and / or land in use
in Ukraine.
Although most agro-industrial companies in Ukraine have
chosen to sell their shares on the Warsaw Stock Exchange, we also have
companies that have placed equity instruments (GDP) at London Stock Exchange (Standard GDRs MM), as well on NASDAQ OMX Stockholm
(table 1).
Although non-public companies are not so big, but among
them is also one of the largest land users in Ukraine - PJSC «Rise Maksymko».
Table 1: Agro-industrial companies of Ukraine analysed
*
|
Name of the company |
Ticker |
Country of incorporation |
Stock Exchange |
Main regions of operation in Ukraine |
Land in use, ha |
1 |
2 |
3 |
4 |
5 |
6 |
7 |
Group of company UX |
||||||
1 |
Avangardco Investment Public Ltd |
AVGR |
Cyprus |
LSE (Standard GDRs MM) |
More than 12 regions |
- |
2 |
Agroton Public Limited |
AGT |
Cyprus |
WSE (main market) |
Luhansk, Kharkiv, Donetsk |
151000 |
3 |
Astarta Holding N.V |
AST |
Netherlands |
WSE (main market) |
Poltava, Kharkiv, Vinnytsia, Khmelnytskyi |
250000 |
4 |
Industrial Milk Company S.A. |
IMC |
Luxembourg |
WSE (main market) |
Poltava, Chernihiv, Sumy |
136600 |
5 |
Kernel Holding S.A. |
KER |
Luxembourg |
WSE (main market) |
13 regions, main Poltava, Khmelnytskyi,
Cherkasy, Chernivtsi |
604500 |
6 |
KSG Agro |
KSG |
Luxembourg |
WSE (main market) |
Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv |
61000 |
7 |
MHP S.A. |
MHPC |
Luxembourg / Ukraine |
LSE (Standard GDRs MM) |
13 regions, main: Kyiv, Cherkasy, Sumy,
Vinnytsia |
370000 |
8 |
Ovostar union N.V. |
OVO |
Netherlands |
WSE (main market) |
Kyiv, Cherkasy |
- |
9 |
Milkiland N.V. |
MLK |
Netherlands |
WSE (main market) |
Sumy, Chernihiv, Khmelnytskyi, Ternopil |
- |
10 |
Trigon Agri |
TAGR |
Denmark |
NASDAQ OMX Stockholm |
Kharkiv, Kirovohrad |
46000 |
|
||||||
Group of company UA |
||||||
11 |
«APK-Invest» |
APK |
Ukraine |
- |
Donetsk |
35000 |
12 |
"Ahrokombinat "Slobozhanskyy" |
SLO |
Ukraine |
- |
Kharkiv |
7500 |
13 |
"Ahrokombinat "Kalyta" |
KAL |
Ukraine |
- |
Kyiv |
- |
14 |
«Ahropromyslova kompaniya» |
ACO |
Ukraine |
- |
Zaporizhzhia |
11000 |
15 |
"Ahro-Soyuz" |
ASZ |
Ukraine |
- |
Ivano-Frankivsk |
н.а. |
16 |
"Bakhmutskyy ahrarnyy soyuz" |
BAS |
Ukraine |
- |
Donetsk |
13000 |
17 |
"Etnoprodukt" |
ETN |
Ukraine |
- |
Chernihiv |
4000 |
18 |
"Kyiv-Atlantic Ukraine" |
KAU |
Ukraine |
- |
Kyiv |
13000 |
19 |
«Sad» |
SAD |
Ukraine |
- |
Sumy |
4500 |
20 |
«Rise-Maksymko» |
RSM |
Ukraine |
- |
All regions but Zakarpattia, Chernivtsi,
Odesa. Main regions: Sumy, Poltava |
653000 |
* Sources: sites of companies; WSE; https://smida.gov.ua/db/emitent
As is discernable from figure 1 and 2 the effect of a
twin agency problem is felt in Ukrainian agro-industrial companies. Thus, among
UX group companies (Figure 1 and 2), in all companies with the exception of
only Kernel, Astarta and Trigon Agri, the founders of the companies (one or
more) retain more than 50% of the shares. The largest concentration of property
in the Avantguard is 77.5% in the hands of Oleg Bakhmatyuk, who inherits this
type of ownership in virtually all of his companies. More than 70% of the
property concentration is also Agroton (75.53%) Milkiland (73.52%) and IMC
(71.75%). In Agroton, 75.53% belongs to the founder Yuri Zhuravlyov, a similar
situation in the IMC, where 71.75% of the shares belong to Cypres’ Agrovalley
Limited, the end beneficiary of which is company’s founder Alexander Petrov.
KSG Agro - 64.62% of shares held by Swiss company OLBIS INVESTMENTS LTD SA
owned by Sergiy Kasyanov.
Graph
1: Share of equity instruments owned by the founders, main shareholders of UX
group companies, %
Next,
the Cypriot WTI Trading Limited, whose beneficiary is Yuri Kosyuk, holds a 66%
interest in MHP. Prime One Capital Limited, which owns more than 70% of the
shares of Ovostar, is controlled by Boris Belikov (General Director) and Vitali
Veresenko (Chairman of the Board of Directors). Through the Dutch 1 Inc.
Cooperatief U.A. Anatoly Yurkevich owns 39.81% of the shares of the company
‘Milkiland’, while 33.71% in Milkiland, through the same company belong to Olga
Yurkevich. Also 5% through the Dutch R-ASSETS COOPERATIEF U.A. owns former top
manager Vyacheslav Rekov.
The
complicated scheme of ownership is presented in Graph 2. In general, the
concept of "50 families" is confirmed. As could be easily discern all
but one owner owns companies indirectly through other companies. Only the owner
of Agroton Public Limited has control over the company as individual.
Graph
2: Owners and way of owning public companies with a significant share of the
leading owner
A slightly different situation is with the UA group
companies (figure 3). In most UA group companies, the majority shareholder owns
90% or more. In two cases, the concentration of ownership is absolute - 100%.
However, a complete picture of ownership cannot be established due to the lack
of disclosure on this issue. In particular, in the Bakhmut Agrarian Union- BAS,
there are actually three owners who have worked for a long time in the other
big agroholding, and there are no minority shareholders in this company. With
regard to the Slobozhansky Agricultural Complex - SLO, the structure of its
ownership may indicate that owning it four firms could have two or more owners,
but because of the lack of disclosure on this issue, it is difficult to
establish final beneficiaries.
Graph
3: Share of equity instruments belonging to the largest owner of UA group
companies, %
A significant concentration of property held in
Ukrainian companies (both UX and UA), even after the IPO, indicates that trust
in other sources of property rights is low and only by concentrating most of
the ownership rights in its hands the owner can control the company. Another
option is to draw a staid foreign investor to owners who will serve as bulwark
for any untoward interest to the company.
This is evidenced in particular by international
ratings. "Strength of Investor Protection Index" calculated by Doing
Business was indexed by The © Financial
Freedom Index and Ukraine ended up 116 from out of 184 countries included in
the rankings (“INVESTOR PROTECTION,” n.d.). The main problem is protecting the rights of
investors, especially minority ones.
In fact, for many companies the unchallenged dominance
of large investors, and the usurpation of power by them, is, in fact, the main
agency problem. In other words, not only managers’ accountability to
shareholders, but also the seizure of companies by large shareholders is a
major problem for corporate governance. If the law and enforcement of it does
not provide sufficient protection for investors the founders are compelled to
hold significant shares in their companies, which lead to a high concentration
of ownership.
The carried out research of concentration of ownership
in the context of a twin agency problem proves the presence of the first
component of a twin agency problem in agro-industrial companies of Ukraine - in
the absence of reliable mechanisms for the protection of their assets,
shareholders hold a predominant share of the equity instruments of companies in
their hands. Such an agency problem between majority shareholders and minority
shareholders along with the asymmetry of information and the difference in
voting rights may lead to the squeezing of minority shareholders. Such
concentration creates a pressure on minority shareholders, which is assigned,
for the most part, the role of statisticians or spectators.
The concentration of property today serves as a
substitute for the protection of investors' rights, the most reliable mechanism
for the protection of property, since the institute for the protection of
investors' rights remains very weak. This applies to companies of both group UA
and UX.
3.2.
Ownership
concentration and economic performance
Identifying
the presence of a concentration of property is only the first step of our
study. The next step is to determine how this concentration affects the
performance of the companies. An important part in this is to determine what
indicators are to be used as proxy of economic performance.
Our
model takes into account the papers of predecessors and has much in common with
the models used in (DAHYA; DIMITROV; MCCONNELL, 2008; DEMSETZ; VILLALONGA,
2001; LEPORE, et al., 2017). As a proxy for economic performance we used a
market oriented measure like Tobin’s Q, and three accounting-based measures
namely Net cash flow, EBIDTA, Profit/loss before tax.
The
Demsetz and Lehn (2001) study uses accounting profit as a proxy for firm
performance. Many studies thereafter use Tobin’s Q for measuring economic
performance (SURESHA; RAVIKUMAR, 2018; WALTHOFF-BORM;
VANACKER; COLLEWAERT, 2018).
There
are several significant respects in which these two measures differ. First of
all, accounting profit and Tobin’s Q contrast with each other in regards of
time perspective applied. Accounting figures tends to be rather
backward-looking, whereas Tobin’s Q is regarded as forward-looking. Effectively
there is a difference between ‘what
management has accomplished’ (accounting profit) … and ‘of what management will accomplish’ (Tobin’s Q)
(DEMSETZ; VILLALONGA, 2001).
The
second difference is who forms these indicators. The financial statement, part of
which is profit, is formed by an accountant, while complying with the
requirements of the established standards. Tobin’s Q on the other hand is based
on impressions, internal experiences and perceptions of investors.
3.2.1. Dependent
Variables
For
our study, we chose both market-oriented and accounting indicators; in total we
used 4 indicators as proxy for economic performance. We used a market oriented
measure, the Tobin’s Q, and three accounting-based measures, i.e., Net cash
flow, EBIDTA, Profit/loss before tax. Tobin’s Q was computed as the market
value of assets divided by the book value of total assets, so we used the
coefficient P/BV provided for each company by the WSE. Accounting indicators
have been extracted from financial statements of companies.
3.2.2. Independent
variable
We
measured the ownership concentration using percentage voting rights of the
biggest shareholder as it was at the middle of December 2018. Those data we
gathered resorting to open information of WSE as well as the companies'
websites where we selectively verified information.
3.2.3. Sample
For
our quantitative part of research, we gathered data from Warsaw Stock Exchange
first by selecting all the companies in the Main market of WSE, belonging to
the category ‘Food and drinks’. Since we strived to industry-specific sample,
we deducted companies marked as active in drinks business and ended up with 27
companies in the sample. Due to the lack information on ownership one of those
companies had to be cut which brought the sample down to 26. For each of
remaining 26 firms, for those data are available as of year-end 2018, we
extracted the identity and percentage voting rights of the biggest shareholder.
3.2.4. Findings
We
are going to proceed laying down the findings in three parts: regression, correlation
and test for significance of analysis of variance.
3.2.5. Regression
Based
on surveyed literature, we advance the following hypothesis:
Ho:
There is no positive association between the ownership concentration and
firm performance.
H1:
There is positive association between the ownership concentration and
firm performance.
The
first table of interest is the Model Summary table, as shown below:
Table 2: Model Summary
Model |
R |
R Square |
Adjusted R Square |
Std. Error of the Estimate |
Change Statistics |
||||
R Square Change |
F Change |
df1 |
df2 |
Sig. F Change |
|||||
1 |
.350a |
.122 |
-.073 |
16.80673 |
.122 |
.627 |
4 |
18 |
.649 |
a. Predictors: (Constant), Tobin’s Q (4), Net cash flow (1), EBIDTA (2),
Profit / Loss before tax (3)
This table
2 above provides us with the R and R2 values. The R value represents the simple
correlation and is 0.350, which indicates a low degree of correlation. The R2
value of 0.122 indicates how much of the total variation in the dependent
variable, the ownership of the largest shareholder (CONCEN), cannot be
explained by the independent variables, Net cash flow (1), EBIDTA (2), Profit /
Loss before tax (3), and Tobin’s Q (4).
“The
Standard Error of Estimate” is the standard deviation of the residuals [the ownership
of the largest shareholder (CONCEN) - the ownership of the largest shareholder
(CONCEN)]. The larger the R2, the smaller the SEE will be relative
to the standard deviation of the criterion or dependent variable. This will be
better fit and have less estimation error. The Adjusted R square value of
-0.073 tells us that our model cannot accounts for -7.3% of variance in the
ownership of the largest shareholder (CONCEN) – a poor model. The Significant F
change, p - value of 0.649 is greater than the α – value of 0.05 which makes
the regression model not statistically significance.
Therefore,
we fail to reject the null hypothesis and accept it. We conclude that, there is
no positive association between the ownership concentration and firm
performance.
In
table 3, under the “Unstandardized Coefficients”, we see the Y intercept,
reported as a constant of 61.611, and the slopes (B) of the independent
variables. Thus, we can build the regression equation to predict the ownership
of the largest shareholder (CONCEN) as:
The
ownership of the largest shareholder (CONCEN) = 61.611 + (.000)(Net cash flow)
+ (-8.775E-5)(EBIDTA) + ( 4.602E-5)(Profit / Loss before tax) + (1.103)(Tobin’s
Q).
Again,
under the “Standardized Coefficients”, we find the standardized partial slopes
(Beta). The beta for Tobin’s Q (.282) is greater in value than the beta for
Profit / Loss before tax (.112), EBIDTA (-.351) and Net Cash Flow (-.246). This
tells us that Tobin’s Q is the most important of the four independent variables
but has not significant impact on the dependent variable.
Table 3: Coefficients
Model |
Unstandardized Coefficients |
Standardized Coefficients |
t |
Sig. |
||
B |
Std. Error |
Beta |
||||
1 |
(Constant) |
61.611 |
4.194 |
|
14.691 |
.000 |
Net cash flow(1) |
.000 |
.000 |
-.246 |
-1.049 |
.308 |
|
EBIDTA(2) |
-8.775E-5 |
.000 |
-.351 |
-.592 |
.561 |
|
Profit/loss before tax(3) |
4.602E-5 |
.000 |
.112 |
.189 |
.853 |
|
Tobin’s Q,(4) |
1.103 |
1.292 |
.282 |
.853 |
.405 |
|
a. Dependent Variable: The ownership of
the largest shareholder (CONCEN) |
In the
last output (table 3), the significance p – values of Net cash flow, EBIDTA,
Profit / Loss before tax, Tobin’s Q were 0.308, 0.561, 0.853 and 0.405
respectively. These values are greater than the α – value of 0.05 which also
indicate that their predictor variables do not have large impact on the
dependent variable. Thus, we can also conclude that the regression model is not
statistically significance. In this case, the predictor variables - Net cash
flow, EBIDTA, Profit / Loss before tax, Tobin’s Q does not have much impact to
predict dependent variable - the ownership of the largest shareholder (CONCEN).
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics
|
Mean |
Std. Deviation |
N |
The ownership of the largest
shareholder (CONCEN) (Dependent variable) |
59.7026 |
16.22698 |
23 |
Net cash flow(1) |
7536.7974 |
23802.70169 |
23 |
EBIDTA(2) |
39931.1022 |
64825.62580 |
23 |
Profit/loss before tax(3) |
23264.9070 |
39528.24841 |
23 |
Tobin’s Q,(4) |
1.6230 |
4.15745 |
23 |
The table 4, as shown above gives the
mean, standard deviation and the sample size of the ownership of the largest
shareholder (CONCEN) as well as the four (4) indicators namely: Net cash flow,
EBIDTA, Profit / Loss before tax, Tobin’s Q that were used as proxy for
economic performance in companies.
3.2.6. Correlation
The
multiple correlation coefficients, thus the Pearson’s correlation coefficient
(R) was used to test for the significance of how the predictor variables relate
to the dependent variable. The scatter plots diagrams with regression line,
showing best – fitting straight line that summarizes the relationship the
predictor variables and the dependent variable were also used.
The
following hypotheses were outlined and tested by means of Pearson’s correlation
coefficient (R) and the linearity tested from the scatter plots.
Ho:
There is no linear relationship between the independent variables and the
predictor variables.
H1:
There is linear relationship between the independent variables and the
predictor variables.
The
Pearson’s correlation coefficient “r” values of Net cash flow, EBIDTA, Profit /
Loss before tax, Tobin’s Q were found to be - 0.276, - 0.118, - 0.056 and 0.068
respectively (table 5). These values indicate very low negative correlation for
the Net cash flow, EBIDTA, Profit / Loss before tax. Though the Tobin’s Q had a
positive value but it gives a very low positive correlation. In all these
cases, no linear relationship exists.
In
the second output, the significance p – values of Net cash flow, EBIDTA, Profit
/ Loss before tax, Tobin’s Q. were 0.101, 0.296, 0.400 and 0.378 respectively.
These values are greater than the α – value of 0.05 which also indicate that
their predictor variables do not have a linear relationship with the dependent
variable.
Therefore,
we fail to reject the null hypothesis and accept it. We conclude that, there is
no linear relationship between the dependent and predictor variables. In this
case, the predictor variables - Net cash flow, EBIDTA, Profit / Loss before
tax, Tobin’s Q. does not have a linear relationship with the dependent variable
- the ownership of the largest shareholder (CONCEN).
Table 5: Testing the Pearson’s correlation coefficient “r”
for significance
|
The
ownership of the largest shareholder (CONCEN) (Dependent
variable) |
Net
cash flow(1) |
EBIDTA(2) |
Profit/loss
before tax(3) |
Tobin’s
Q (4) |
|
Pearson Correlation |
The
ownership of the largest shareholder (CONCEN)(Dependent variable) |
1.000 |
-.276 |
-.118 |
-.056 |
.068 |
Net
cash flow(1) |
-.276 |
1.000 |
.301 |
.218 |
.182 |
|
EBIDTA(2) |
-.118 |
.301 |
1.000 |
.920 |
.720 |
|
Profit/loss
before tax(3) |
-.056 |
.218 |
.920 |
1.000 |
.738 |
|
Tobin’s
Q,(4) |
.068 |
.182 |
.720 |
.738 |
1.000 |
|
Sig. (1-tailed) |
The
ownership of the largest shareholder (CONCEN)(Dependent variable) |
. |
.101 |
.296 |
.400 |
.378 |
Net
cash flow (1) |
.101 |
. |
.081 |
.159 |
.204 |
|
EBIDTA(2) |
.296 |
.081 |
. |
.000 |
.000 |
|
Profit/loss
before tax(3) |
.400 |
.159 |
.000 |
. |
.000 |
|
Tobin’s
Q,(4) |
.378 |
.204 |
.000 |
.000 |
. |
|
N |
The
ownership of the largest shareholder (CONCEN)(Dependent variable) |
23 |
23 |
23 |
23 |
23 |
Net
cash flow (1) |
23 |
23 |
23 |
23 |
23 |
|
EBIDTA(2) |
23 |
23 |
23 |
23 |
23 |
|
Profit/loss
before tax(3) |
23 |
23 |
23 |
23 |
23 |
|
Tobin’s Q,(4) |
23 |
23 |
23 |
23 |
23 |
Let us see different variation of
dependent variables against independent one by one.
Table 6: Correlations: The ownership of the largest shareholder
(CONCEN) and net cash flow variables
|
The ownership of the largest
shareholder (CONCEN)(Dependent variable) |
Net cash flow(1) |
|
The ownership of the largest
shareholder (CONCEN)(Dependent variable) |
Pearson Correlation |
1 |
-.028 |
Sig. (2-tailed) |
|
.890 |
|
N |
26 |
26 |
|
Net cash flow(1) |
Pearson Correlation |
-.028 |
1 |
Sig. (2-tailed) |
.890 |
|
|
N |
26 |
26 |
Figure
4: Scatter plot the ownership of the largest shareholder vs. net cash flow
From table 6, the Pearson’s correlation
coefficients r, between the ownership of the largest shareholder (CONCEN) and
net cash flow variables is - 0.028, which indicates a very low degree of
correlation. Again, the correlation between the ownership of the largest
shareholder (CONCEN) and net cash flow is not statistically significant (p >
0.05). Thus, the ownership of the largest shareholder (CONCEN) and net cash
flow variables are not linearly related.
This
is shown also in the scatter plots in Figure 4, where the regression line, showing
best – fitting straight line that summarizes that there is no linear the
relationship the between the ownership of the largest shareholder (CONCEN) and
net cash flow variables
Table 7: Correlations: The ownership of the largest
shareholder (CONCEN) and EBIDTA variables
|
The ownership of the largest
shareholder (CONCEN)(Dependent variable) |
EBIDTA(2) |
|
The ownership of the largest
shareholder (CONCEN)(Dependent variable) |
Pearson Correlation |
1 |
-.044 |
Sig. (2-tailed) |
|
.831 |
|
N |
26 |
26 |
|
EBIDTA(2) |
Pearson Correlation |
-.044 |
1 |
Sig. (2-tailed) |
.831 |
|
|
N |
26 |
26 |
Figure
5: Scatter plot the ownership of the largest shareholder vs. EBIDTA
From table 8, the Pearson’s
correlation coefficients r, between the ownership of the largest shareholder (CONCEN)
and EBIDTA variables is - 0.044, which indicates a very low degree of
correlation. Again, the correlation between the ownership of the largest
shareholder (CONCEN) and EBIDTA is not statistically significant (p > 0.05).
Thus, the ownership of the largest shareholder (CONCEN) and EBIDTA variables
are not linearly related.
This
is shown also in the scatter plots in Figure 5, where the regression line,
showing best- fitting straight line that summarizes that there is no linear the
relationship the between the ownership of the largest shareholder (CONCEN) and
EBIDTA variables.
Table 8: Correlations: The ownership of the largest
shareholder (CONCEN) and Profit / Loss before tax variables
|
The ownership of the largest shareholder
(CONCEN)(Dependent variable) |
Profit/loss before tax(3) |
|
The ownership of the largest
shareholder (CONCEN)(Dependent variable) |
Pearson Correlation |
1 |
.013 |
Sig. (2-tailed) |
|
.951 |
|
N |
26 |
25 |
|
Profit/loss before tax(3) |
Pearson Correlation |
.013 |
1 |
Sig. (2-tailed) |
.951 |
|
|
N |
25 |
25 |
From table 8, the Pearson’s
correlation coefficients r, between the ownership of the largest shareholder
(CONCEN) and Profit / Loss before tax variables is - 0.013, which indicates a very
low degree of correlation. Again, the correlation between the ownership of the
largest shareholder (CONCEN) and Profit/Loss before tax is not statistically
significant (p > 0.05). Thus, the ownership of the largest shareholder
(CONCEN) and Profit / Loss before tax variables are not linearly related.
This
is shown also in the scatter plots in Figure 6, where the regression line,
showing best – fitting straight line that summarizes that there is no linear
the relationship the between the ownership of the largest shareholder (CONCEN)
and Profit / Loss before tax variables.
Graph
6: Scatter plot the ownership of the largest shareholder vs. Profit / Loss
before tax
From table 9 we see that the Pearson’s
correlation coefficients r, between the ownership of the largest shareholder
(CONCEN) and Tobin’s Q variables is 0.068, which indicates a very low degree of
correlation. Again, the correlation between the ownership of the largest
shareholder (CONCEN) and Tobin’s Q is not statistically significant (p >
0.05). Thus, the ownership of the largest shareholder (CONCEN) and Tobin’s Q
variables are not linearly related.
Table 9: Correlations: The ownership of the largest
shareholder (CONCEN) and Tobin’s Q variables
|
The ownership of the largest
shareholder (CONCEN)(Dependent variable) |
Tobin’s Q,(4) |
|
The ownership of the largest
shareholder (CONCEN)(Dependent variable) |
Pearson Correlation |
1 |
.068 |
Sig. (2-tailed) |
|
.754 |
|
N |
26 |
24 |
|
Tobin’s Q,(4) |
Pearson Correlation |
.068 |
1 |
Sig. (2-tailed) |
.754 |
|
|
N |
24 |
24 |
This
is shown also in the scatter plots in Graph 7, where the regression line,
showing best- fitting straight line that summarizes that there is no linear the
relationship the between the ownership of the largest shareholder (CONCEN) and
Tobin’s Q variables.
Graph
7: Scatter plot the ownership of the largest shareholder vs. Tobin’s Q
3.2.7. A
test for significance of analysis of variance
We used the F ratio test for
significance. We also take a look at some of the assumptions underlying the
ANOVA test. We will use this Model: Independent random variables,
Level of measurements, Populations are normally distributed, Population
variances are equal.
The hypotheses were:
Ho: There exist equal means between the independent or
predictor variables.
H1: At least one of the population means between the
independent or predictor variables is different.
Now we will use the ANOVA
table, which reports how well the regression equation fits the data (i.e.,
predicts the dependent variable) and is shown below:
Table 10: ANOVA
Model |
Sum of
Squares |
df |
Mean
Square |
F |
Sig. |
|
1 |
Regression |
708.538 |
4 |
177.134 |
.627 |
.649a |
Residual |
5084.392 |
18 |
282.466 |
|
|
|
Total |
5792.930 |
22 |
|
|
|
|
a. Predictors: (Constant), Tobin’s Q,(4), Net cash
flow(1), EBIDTA(2), Profit/loss before tax(3)
b. Dependent Variable: The ownership of the
largest shareholder (CONCEN)
From table 10 above, the regression model
used in the ANOVA test does not significantly predict the dependent variable
well. In this case, the regression model is not statistically significantly to
predict the outcome variable. Thus, it is not a good fit for the data.
Using the F test, with a p - significance value of 0.649, is
greater than the α – value of 0.05, and indicates that, we fail to reject the
null hypothesis and accept it. Therefore, we can conclude that there exist
equal means between the independent or predictor variables.
Consequently,
we have not found any confirmation of the existence of a statistically
significant relation between the concentration of ownership and the economic
performance of enterprises. Although we did not find dependencies, the negative
result outcomes, is also an outcome. Concentration of ownership does not affect
the economic performance of analysed companies, regardless of whether we take
for the analysis the accounting indicators (Profit) or market-based indicators
(Tobin’s Q).
However,
the strongest link exists between CONCEN and Tobin’s Q. We believe that is an
indication of favourable investor’s reaction to such concentration, because
they perceive the situation in the same light: the investor's weak protection
compels the company, in order to reduce risk of expropriation of property, to
concentrate ownership. The market encourages concentration of ownership in
jurisdictions with weak investor protection.
4. CONCLUSIONS
The concentration of property is an
issue that is currently acute, especially for countries for which the market
economy was not a native environment even a few decades ago. Our study aimed to
identify the presence / absence of ownership concentration in agro-industrial
companies in Ukraine and to investigate the possible impact of these processes
on the economic performance of companies.
We have proven that there is a
significant level of ownership concentration among analysed companies in both
groups UX and UA. Although there are exceptions, there is a general tendency to
hold a large share of equity instruments by the founders or major owners. We
describe this phenomenon through a twin agency problem, arguing that such a
large share of power concentration serves as a substitute for a weak
environment for protecting investor rights.
Concentration of property is the
protection from unwanted interventions from both third parties and from state
rulers. Some existing exceptions, we argue, are due to the involvement of
powerful co-owners who provide for all sorts of shields against untoward
interest.
The study has found no significant
relationship between ownership concentration and several indicators used as
proxy for economic performance, namely Net cash flow, EBIDTA, Profit/loss
before tax, Tobin’s Q. In our model the R value is 0.350, which indicates a low
degree of correlation. Our model cannot account for -7.3% of variance in the
ownership of the largest shareholder (CONCEN) (The Adjusted R square value of
-0.073 – table 2).
The Significant F change, p - value
of 0.649 is greater than the α – value of 0.05 which makes the regression model
not statistically significance. Therefore, we fail to reject the null
hypothesis and accept it. We conclude that, there is no positive association
between the ownership concentration and firm performance. The significance p –
values of Net cash flow, EBIDTA, Profit / Loss before tax, Tobin’s Q were
0.308, 0.561, 0.853 and 0.405 respectively.
These values are greater than the α
– value of 0.05 which also indicate that their predictor variables do not have
large impact on the dependent variable. Thus, we can also conclude that the
regression model is not statistically significance. In this case, the predictor
variables - Net cash flow, EBIDTA, Profit / Loss before tax, Tobin’s Q. does
not have much impact to predict dependent variable - the ownership of the
largest shareholder (CONCEN).
The Pearson’s correlation
coefficient “r” values of Net cash flow, EBIDTA, Profit / Loss before tax,
Tobin’s Q were found to be - 0.276, - 0.118, - 0.056 and 0.068 respectively
(table 5). These values indicate very low negative correlation for the Net cash
flow, EBIDTA, Profit / Loss before tax. Though the Tobin’s Q had a positive
value but it gives a very low positive correlation. In these cases, no linear
relationship exists.
Our findings indicate that
concentration of ownership does not affect the economic performance of analysed
companies, regardless of whether we take for the analysis the accounting
indicators (Profit) or market-based indicators (Tobin’s Q). However, we emphasize that the strongest link
exists between CONCEN and Tobin’s Q.
Investors themselves and the market
are also reacting positively to such concentrating, because they perceive the
situation in the same light: the investor's weak protection compel the company,
in order to reduce risk of expropriation of property, to concentrate ownership.
The market encourages concentration of ownership in jurisdictions with weak
investor protection.
An agency issue of corporate
insider's action at their discretion should be absorbed by properly organized
corporate governance. In this regard, the further direction of research in this
area would be the development of practical measures to strengthen corporate
governance at the company level and the regulation of the protection of
minority shareholder rights at the state’s level.
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