1. INTRODUCTION
According to The New Webster’s
Dictionary of the English Language (2004) reform means to improve by removing
faults and weaknesses, or by strengthening good quality, to put an end to evil,
abuse, mismanagement, etc. Also, mismanagement is to manage incompetently, or
dishonestly.
In an effort to operationalize the
concept of reform, Campos and Bhargava (2007) suggest that the general
principles of reform involves to increase transparency, improve accountability,
reduce discretion, dilute monopoly powers and to get a solid practical grip on
combating corruption in all its ramifications.
Stapenhurst and Sedigh (1999) posit
that reforms can also involve the privatization of inefficient parastatals
that, because of their monopoly positions consume huge sums from public and
private funds. Girishanker, et al (2002) believes that reforms sustainability
is important because they have longer gestation periods than policy changes.
They posit that most important for
reform sustainability is the link between the design of reforms and the
environment in which they must take root if they are to be effective. Reforms
in Nigeria have been virtually turned into chaos because of the major
contributions of corruption, unethical behaviours and mismanagement (ENI, 2006).
According to Zimmerman (1994)
curbing unethical behavior in government and mismanagement are necessary for
ensuring reform success and sustainability. Nigeria has always developed
policies or programmes targeted at alleviating poverty and food security over
the past decades. Some of those policies included the Green Revolution,
Operation Feed the Nation (OFN), National Directorate of Employment, (NDE)
Directorate of Food, Roads and Rural Infrastructures (DFRRI), Structural
Adjustment Programme (SAP), among others.
The major problems against the
policy reforms developed over the years were corruption, lack of continuity in
policy implementation, instability of the political and social environments and
mismanagement. However, there were signals of corruption and mismanagement of
public sector resources in Nigeria prior to independence in 1960.
According to Smith (2005) before
independence, the British had planned to hand over political power to a corrupt
group of politicians, and immediately after independence Nigeria’s public money
started moving into private Swiss bank accounts.
According to Anyim and Akanwa (2002)
mismanagement worsened when in 1960, the democratically elected representatives
joined the vicious circle and it became known that the problem of Nigeria was
simply and squarely corruption.
According to Adebimpe (2011)
corruption became a principal means of private accumulation during the
decolonization process. Also the programme of developing a local banking
culture was drenched in mismanagement during the decolonization process.
According to Toby (1999) while the
policy was elegant on paper, the relationship between the local banks and the
people managing the affairs were issues of debate and public inquiry, because
the methods of injecting public funds into the banks as well as the use made of
such money became questionable. In this regard, tribunals were set up to probe
particularly into the affairs of the African Continental Bank Ltd (ACB) and the
National Bank of Nigeria Ltd (NBN).
In the case of ACB, the Foster
Sutton Tribunal (1962) found that the manner of injecting public funds into the
bank was shrouded in mystery because no witness chose to tell the truth. In the
case of NBN, the Coker Commission (1962) stated that the finances of the bank
did not present a very happy picture because: (a) the huge loans outstanding in
the names of the erstwhile directors of the bank, and or persons, or companies
in which they were interested, and (b) loans to the Action Group which were
operated in various names were not secured in any shape or form.
The mismanagement galore continued
unabated from 1960 through 1966 when the military demanded for sound management
and accountability of the natural resources. According to the coup makers: “Our
enemies are the political profiteers, swindlers, the men in high and low places
that seek bribes and demand ten percent, those that keep the country divided so that they can remain in
office as ministers and VIPs of waste” (AGWUNOBI, 2005).
The military could not even stop the
mismanagement and swindling of the economy that made it to takeover political
power. Rather, mismanagement waxed stronger through the Gowonian era in the
1970s when government thought that money was never the problem, but how to spend
it. With huge wealth, the FESTAC jamboree and other white elephant projects,
the nation kept its seat among the poorest nations in the world.
The monumental mismanagement of the
economy did not amuse General Mohammed and his group who took over power in a
bloodless coup in 1975 on the basis of “misgovernment” and immediately
conducted a massive purge in both the civil and public services, in an attempt
to return sanity to public governance.
Mismanagement overpowered the
succeeding civilian government with allegations of missing billions of oil
revenue through the inefficiency of the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation
(NNPC). The Shagari government thought that the allegations of missing huge
sums of money from the oil revenue were very critical and set up the Irekife
Crude Oil Sales Tribunal of Inquiry over the problem.
The Tribunal duly reported and
showed that while NNPC accounting was in a deplorable state; the missing money
was not simply mismanagement, but money which had gone to oil companies under
the “interpretation of their agreement with NNPC” (TIJJANI; WILLIAMS, 1981).
Such stories of “interpretation of
their agreement” did not go down well with General Buhari and his colleagues
who took over government in the wee hours of December 31, 1983 accusing the
Shagari administration of mismanagement, incompetence, and abuse of public
funds amounting to billions of naira. Even though General Buhari and his gang
were quickly swept away by General Babangida and his boys in 1985, mismanagement
of the common wealth of Nigeria continued (AGWUNOBI, 2005).
By 2001 there was a serious issue of
N400billion of Nigeria’s looted funds in 19 United Kingdom banks and also that
$200billion made from oil between 1970 and 1990 was mismanage and could not be
accounted for. In addition, the late Pius Okigbo Probe Panel found that the
Nation’s N1.2trillion oil windfall from the Gulf War was mismanaged and could
not be accounted for.
According to Anyim and Akanwa (2002)
the leadership of the country represented by Obasanjo admitted that “the
government and all its agencies were thoroughly corrupt and reckless. Members
of the public bribe their way through in ministries and parastatals to get
attention and one government agency had to bribe another government agency to
obtain release of their statutory allocation of funds.
The impact of official corruption
and mismanagement became so rampant and distorted and retrogressed
development”. Distortion or retrogression of development is epitomized by
reform failure in all aspects as is the case in Nigeria today. The
mismanagement train moved from 1999 through 2015 when people would gather to
share public money, even in cash of different currencies (ADEYEMI, 2015; DASUKI,
2015).
According to Zayyad (1998) since
independence in 1960 and particularly in the decades of the 1970s, Nigeria
developed a large public sector involving social programmes, banking,
insurance, oil marketing and refining, cement plants, paper and steel mills,
hotels and tourism, textile plants, motor assembly plants, sea and air
transportation, sugar estates, among others.
However, throughout this period,
mismanagement was the bane of public enterprises and programmes in Nigeria. As
a way out of the woods, the idea of privatization and commercialization was
introduced with the promulgation of Privatization and Commercialization Decree N.
25 of 1988.
Zayyad (1998) posits that by 1998,
Nigeria had over two thousand (2000) public enterprises (PEs) at the federal
and state levels which could be categorized as public utilities, strategic
industries, economic and commercial enterprises as well as departmental and
statutory boards, agencies and programmes.
However, the government decided to
privatize, commercialize or even sell the economic commercial, and some
strategic PEs because, without exception, they were found to be infested with
problems such as general inefficiency, confused and conflicting missions,
political interference in operating decisions, misuse of monopoly powers,
defective capital structures, bureaucratic hiccups in their relations with
supervising ministries, nepotism, corruption and mismanagement.
Socio-economic as well as political
reforms is essential for the development of any nation. And to achieve reform
success requires the commitment of governanment. According to Obasanjo (2005)
“As you all know, we have put in place a holistic economic reform agenda
covering accelerated privatization, public and civil service reforms and a war
against corruption.
The socio-economic reforms would
achieve little without appropriate people-driven and people-centred political
reforms. A bad and undemocratic environment can undermine, damage and destroy a
buoyant economy and vice-cersa”. In pursuing reforms, he posits that: “Our
current political arrangement has some identical distortions, defects and
limitations that call for urgent, focused and realistic attention, hence this
initiative on political reforms”.
Despite his personal commitment to
reforms, they failed largely due to corruption and mismanagement in public
life. Also, on the framework of National Economic Empowerment and Development
Strategy (NEEDS), the National Poverty Eradication Proprogramme, popularly
known as The Keke Napep programme, was introduced.
The Keke Nanep programme which was
the initiative of President Olusegun Obasanjo’s administration was designed
with the objectives of wealth creation, employment generation, poverty
reduction and value re-orientation, because the president was particularly
worried at the levels of poverty and unemployment in Nigeria.
According to Okonkwo (2005) Keke
Nenap was a cardinal programme of the Obasanjo administration aimed largely at
eradicating poverty by providing employment to thousands of unemployed youths
around the country. The reform programme was initiated in the hope that it
would ameliorate the acute transportation problems in Nigeria, and also help in
converting the enormous wasting national human capital, popularly known as
“area boys” to a productive workforce.
This national reform policy was
started with the distribution of 4000 kekes (tricycle) by Mr. President.
Shortly after that, the budgetary allocation for the programme was mismanaged
and it died a natural death at the national level. Sound public sector
management is necessary for reform success because even if an economy is
buoyant it can be destroyed by mismanagement.
For example, despite the growth in
GDP from about N34 trillion in 2010, to N37 trillion in 2011, and N41 trillion
in 2012, there was no significant economic development due largely to gross
mismanagement (OKAFOR, 2014). This portrays a classic situation of growth
without development as youth unemployment and mass poverty remained at the
highest levels in the country (FAFOWORA, 2016; EHIKIOYA, 2015; ADEYEORU, 2015).
According to Levi, et al (2007)
reforms hardly survive in a country without the culture of integrity,
transparency and accountability, which will help in fighting all forms of
corruption. They posit that large-scale impunity in a country results in and
reflects the rule of law which in turn encourages mismanagement and undermines
reforms.
Corruption and mismanagement are
inimical to reforms because about 85 percent of reforms have failed since the
1960s because of such unwholesome factors. At present various programmes and
projects worth over N15trillion that would improve the living standards of the
people are abandoned largely due to mismanagement (AGBAKURUM, 2015; OMOTOSHO,
2011; UDOKA, 2014; UMANIKOGBO, 2007; AGBOGU, et al., 2015; ESSEN, 2016; WORLD
BANK, 2000; 1996; WDR, 2015; OKWE, 2013).
1.1.
Statement
of the Problem
For years, mismanagement, and undue
political interference tended to frustrate the success of socio-economic
reforms in Nigeria. For example, Iroanya (1998) blames the failure of past
small-scale industry support programmes of government on lack of proper
focusing by both the government and the beneficiaries.
According to him, the NDE, People
Bank, Better-Life, “were good on paper but when they got on the ground, they
were hijacked”. Some of the beneficiaries had no genuine intention of setting
up the business they proposed and were only interested in getting the money
while the benefactors (the government) allowed political and non-economic
factors to determine who got the loans.
A primary challenge to
socio-economic development is entrenched political and bureaucratic corruption.
These are tightly organized and internally stable, creating and being sustained
by conditions of weak political competition, slow and uneven economic growth,
weak political will, and a weak civil society that foster corruption (STAPENHURST;
KPUNDEH, 1999).
Mauro (1997) states that extensive
corruption tends to depress investment and economic growth. Keefer and Knack
(1995) argue that corruption is part of a syndrome of poor-quality institutions
linked to slow economic growth (DIA, 1993; LIGHT, 1993).
The deregulation of the Nigerian
economy under the SAP framework resulted to the introduction of different
reforms. But due to unpredictable, poor implementation and mismanagement the
full gains of such reforms were not realized. Consequently the Nigerian economy
started experiencing economic recession from 1981, as characterized by low
capacity utilization, low incomes, low consumption, and low profits as well as
depressed economic activities (NZOTTA, 2002).
Many stakeholders in the Nigerian
project believe that the nation has the misfortune of bad governance. For
example according to Ozekhome (2016) misgovernance in Nigeria is epitomized by
ethno-religious crisis, mutual suspicion, nepotism, cronyism, tribalism, social
crimes and others that have heightened mass retrenchment, unemployment,
geometrical inflation, hunger, squalor, despair and disillusionment, as well as
despondency, hopelessness, haplessness, pauperization, among other evils.
The issue of corruption and
mismanagement needs more reporting now than ever before, because of the damage
it has done to Nigeria. Before now public resources were mismanaged with
blatant impunity and among the result is the present economic hardship.
According to Nna, et al (2010) in
the recent past governors in Nigeria was notorious for diverting their
statutory monthly allocations to private foreign bank accounts. According to
them the UN had estimated that out of $400bn hidden in foreign banks by
Africans, Nigeria contributed $100bn. Reform programmes in Nigeria were bound
to fail because the money preposterously budgeted to fund them were usually
embezzled.
1.2.
Objective of the Study
This study was designed to explore
the role of mismanagement and its impact on government reforms and
socio-economic development in Nigeria and make necessary recommendations for
implementation.
1.3.
Significance of the Study
The study would enable students,
academics, governments’, donor agencies, and others interested in public sector
management and sustainable development to appreciate the need to fight against
corruption and mismanagement in Nigeria.
1.4.
Research Questions
a)
Is
there any evidence of reform failures in Nigeria?
b)
Is
there any evidence that corruption and mismanagement lead to reform failures in
Nigeria?
c)
Is
there any evidence of corruption in Nigeria?
d)
Is
there any evidence of mismanagement Nigeria?
1.5.
Restatement of Research Questions
a)
There
is evidence of reform failures in Nigeria.
b)
There
is evidence that corruption and mismanagement lead to reform failures in
Nigeria.
c)
There
is evidence of corruption in Nigeria.
d)
There
is evidence of mismanagement in Nigeria.
2. LITERATURE REVIEW
The impact of mismanagement of
public financial resources has often frustrated reform programmes. According to
Stasinopoulous (2006) alleged mismanagement of EU finances, was responsible for
unsuccessful institutional reforms by the EU in the 1990s. He believes that
because of mismanagement and maladministration the EU could not carry out its
reform agenda to: “fight fraud, corruption, and any other irregular activity,
including misconduct within the European Institutions”.
From this account, ultimately,
mismanagement led to the resignation of the Santer Commission in 1999.
Mismanagement and corruption are issues that have negatively affected the
progress of reform initiatives in Nigeria since the colonial period in the
1950s through the years.
According to Smith (2005) the
British perpetuated treachery in Nigeria at Independence in 1960. He believed
that the British wanted to hand over power to a group of corrupt politicians.
Obiozor (2015) posit that leadership and nation-building have consistently been
Nigeria’s most constant priority agenda before and since independence in 1960.
This problem of leadership and
nation-building characterized by mismanagement and corruption led to the
military takeover of government in Nigeria on 15th January 1966. The
soldiers could not afford to join the “watching game” as the nation’s common
resources were being mismanaged by a handful of corrupt politicians. Such
corrupt activities also took place in other African countries like Kenya.
For example, according to Matiangi
(2006) corruption is one of the socioeconomic and political challenges of
independent Kenya. According to him, corruption is pervasive in Kenya, and it
affects the country’s public and private life. Many institutions of its
government, including parliament, the judiciary, and especially the executive
arm, have been affected by corruption.
According to Kpundeh and Dininio
(2006) “once people feel that they personally have a stake in the elimination
or control of corruption and that they have the power to do something about it,
they can demand action from the leadership. Their support is crucial in forming
constituencies and galvanizing the political will to pursue reform.
According to Kaufmann (1999)
Botswana owes its reform success to sound public sector management it had
earlier instituted. He posits that for any reform to succeed it must go hand in
hand with credible leadership that is free from political interference, because
where bureaucrats and politicians intervene at will to apply regulatory
restrictions, reform success is often impeded.
Combating mismanagement and
corruption is not an end in itself, but it is incidental and instrumental to
the broader goal of more effective, fair, and efficient government which in
turn is associated with greater economic development (Pope, 1999).
For example, as a way to enforce
reforms and to win economic independence, the government of Uganda in the 1970s
took over the major means of production and distribution with all import and
export businesses placed in the hands of state corporations and 60 percent
holding taken in oil companies, banks credit institutions, insurance firms,
transport companies, and every important manufacturing industry and plantation.
However, such attempts were undermined by discrepancies and rampant corruption
and mismanagement of national resources (MARTIN, 1978).
Experts now agree that good
governance can be used to reduce fraud and mismanagement, so as to ensure
reform success. Speaking on “Good Governance: A Veritable Tool for Fighting
Fraud During Economic Recession”.
Oyedokun (2016) posits that: “We are
in a recession because what we have cannot sustain us. It is not because we
cannot produce or that we lack the capacity to produce. But it is because of
mismanagement and lack of focus”. Instilling the principles of sound management
and good governance is essential to effective fraud detection, reducing
corruption, poverty, unemployment, and mismanagement in Nigeria, without which
reform implementation and success will be difficult to achieve.
3. METHODOLOGY
3.1.
Research Design
The exploratory research design was
used for the study. The researcher using this technique may not engage in
hypothesis testing. Exploratory field study is as scientific as hypothesis
testing field study (NWORUH, 2004; OBODOEZE, 2008). Exploratory study is
evolutionary and historical in nature and it rarely involves the employment of
large samples or use of structured questionnaire (ASIKA, 2004).
3.2.
Sources of Data
Data for the study were generated
through books, journals, government gazettes, newspapers, among others.
3.3.
Data Analysis Procedure
Data were analyzed through
descriptive statistics with absolute numbers and percentages, and result
presented in tables.
4. PRESENTATION OF RESULTS
Table 1: 20 Selected Reform
Programmes in Nigeria – 1960s - 2000
|
S/N |
Year |
Description
|
Objectives |
Status |
|
1 |
1960s |
Operation Back to Land |
To support
the establishment of Farm Settlement Schemes |
Failed |
|
2 |
1967 – 1970 |
Land Army |
To encourage
agricultural activities |
Failed |
|
3 |
1976 |
Operation Feed the Nation (OFN) |
To make food
more abundant and reduce poverty |
Failed |
|
4 |
1979 |
Green Revolution |
To enhance
food production |
Failed |
|
5 |
1977 |
National Accelerated Food Production
Programme (NAFPP) |
To increase
agricultural activities and food production |
Failed |
|
6 |
1977 |
Rural Banking Programme |
To encourage
banking credit to rural dwellers for productive activities |
Failed |
|
7 |
1977 |
River Basin and Rural Development
Authorities |
To speed up
rural development and food production |
Epileptic |
|
8 |
1978 |
Land use Reform |
To make land
easily available for agric activities |
Failed |
|
9 |
1998 |
Petroleum Trust Fund (PTF) |
To
reconstruct federal roads, hospitals and decayed infrastructures |
Failed |
|
10 |
1984 |
War Against Indiscipline (WAI) |
To fight
corruption and indiscipline in the polity |
Failed |
|
11 |
1986 |
Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) |
To reengineer
the Nigerian economy |
Failed |
|
12 |
1986 |
Second Tier Foreign Exchange Market |
To enhance
the allocative efficiency of forex |
Failed |
|
13 |
1986 |
National Directorate of Employment (NDE) |
To deal with
the problem of youth unemployment |
Epileptic |
|
14 |
1986 |
Directorate of Food, Roads and Rural
Infrastructure (DFRRI) |
To
reconstruct rural infrastructure and alleviate poverty in rural areas |
Failed |
|
15 |
1986 |
Directorate for Mass Mobilization
(MAMSER) |
To reduce
mass illiteracy in Nigeria |
Failed |
|
16 |
1986 |
National Economic Reconstruction Fund
(NERFUND) |
To provide
funds in support of SMEs |
Mismanaged |
|
17 |
1988 |
Privatization and commercialization
programme |
To reduce
wastages and losses in public enterprises |
Failed |
|
18 |
1990 |
Peoples Bank of Nigeria |
To provide
banking facilities and credit mobilization in the rural areas |
Failed |
|
19 |
1990 |
Community banking |
To provide
banking facilities in the rural areas |
Failed |
|
20 |
1997 |
Family Economic Advancement Programme
(FEAP) |
To provide
credit facilities to the active poor for economic activities |
Failed |
Source:
Various Reports, Books, Gazettes, Newspaper, Decrees, Etc. (2016)
Table
1 showed 20 selected reform programmes out of which about 76 percent failed due
mostly to mismanagement.
Table 2: Some Examples of
Mismanagement Issues between 1960s/2015
|
S/N |
Brief
Details |
Specific
Amount |
Primary
Source |
|
1 |
In the 1960s there were signs of
mismanagement and corruption in Nigeria. |
Not specified |
Smith (2005) |
|
2 |
The 1972 National accelerated food
production programme became a colossal waste due to high profile corruption
and mismanagement |
Not specified |
Nna, et al, (2010) |
|
3 |
In 1979 N2billion tax payers money was
mismanaged through Green Revolution Programme |
N2bn |
Nna, et al, (2010) |
|
4 |
In 1979 there were serious allegation
that the NNPC mismanaged N2.8b that would have been used to provide public
services |
N28bn |
Tijjani and Williams (1981) |
|
5 |
In 2001 there was allegation that
N400billion Nigeria’s looted funds were in 19 UK banks |
N400bn |
Anyim and Akanwa (2002) |
|
6 |
In 2001 there was serious allegation
that $200 billion metre from oil between 1970 and 1980 was bluntly mismanaged
|
$200bn |
Anyim and Akanwa (2002) |
|
7 |
Over the years, there has been reports
that the Late Pius Okigbo Probe Panel found that the Nations N1.2trillion oil
windfall from the Gulf war was mismanaged and could not be accounted for. |
N1.2trn |
Anyim and Akanwa (2002) |
|
8 |
Over N80billion pumped into DFRRI was
mismanaged |
Over N80bn |
Nna, et al, (2010) |
|
9 |
Funds for MAMSER, PBN, CBP, BLP, FSP,
FEAP, were thoroughly mismanaged |
Over N10bn |
Nna, et al, (2010) |
|
10 |
PTF wasted over N135 billion through
over invoicing, corruption, mismanagement, etc. |
N135bn |
Nna, et al, (2010) |
|
11 |
The Abacha misgovernance/mismanagement
case (a)
$4billion through property crimes etc (b)
$100million cash in 38 suit cases (c)
$660 million in 19 Swiss banks (d)
$39 million Citibank deal (e)
$1.3 billion in 23 Uk banks |
$4billion $100million $660 million $39 million $1.3 billion |
Levi, et al, (2007) |
|
12 |
The 2015 armsgate scandal involving
the National Security Adviser (NSA) |
$2.2billion |
Dasuki, (2015) |
|
13 |
Estimated amount stolen or mismanaged
by previous administrations as at 2016 |
$150billion |
Laccino (2015) |
|
14 |
Coker Commission (1962) mismanagement of
the Western Region’s Finances by the
government through NBN |
Millions of pounds |
Toby (1999) |
|
15 |
Foster Sutton Tribunal (1962)
Mismanagement of the Eastern Region’s
Finances by the government through ACB |
Millions of pounds |
Toby (1999) |
Sources:
Field Work (2016) Adapted from various reports
Table 2 Proved the serious case of
mismanagement corruption and financial recklessness in Nigeria. Even though
other macroeconomic factors may contribute to the failure of reforms, the
issues under investigation play very important role in undermining good
governance process.
According to Nna, et al (2010) There
were several cases of embezzlement of funds meant to assist rural farmers in
boosting agriculture, but mismanagement and corruption facilitated the government
programmes.
The growth rate in Figure 1 did not
translate into development largely due to corruption and mismanagement.
Figure 1: Annual Growth Rates in
GDP 2010 - 2012
Source:
Field work 2016 adapted from Okafor (2014)
Figure 2 showed unemployment levels
in Nigeria up to 2011. This showed that the numerous reform programmes failed
to achieve their objectives (OSEHOBO, 2012).
Figure 2: Unemployment Rate in
Nigeria (%) 2006 – 2011
Source:
Field work 2016 adapted from Ugoani and Ibeenwo (2015)
As in table 5, the absolute poverty
rate remains high, which confirms the failure of reform programmes in Nigeria
over the years.
Figure 3: Absolute Poverty Rate
(%) in Nigeria – 2004 – 2011
Source:
Field work 2016 adapted from Okafor (2014)
4.1.
Discussion of Results
Although there may be other factors
responsible for reform failure, as a contribution to knowledge, this
investigation provided important verifiable evidence of a robust positive
evidence of the association of mismanagement and reform failure. As catalogued
in table 1, it would appear that the Nigerian sovereign state became a child of
corruption and mismanagement.
The colonial masters entrenched
corruption and mismanagement before 1960, and from then Nigerians took over,
and continued with impunity to perpetuate corruption and mismanagement. This
can explain why despite the periods of oil boom, about 85 percent of reform
programmes failed between 1960 and 2000.
With Nigerians contributing about 25
percent of the $400 billion stolen by Africans and kept away in foreign bank
accounts, it would have been a miracle for reform programmes to succeed without
matching funds. Mushrooming of programmes for poverty alleviation became highly
preposterous and a powerful conduit for embezzlement of public funds and gross
mismanagement.
Corruption which involves the use of
public funds for private gains is another way of describing mismanagement or
maladministration. Beginning from the last days of the colonial overlords,
through the 1960s and 1970s, up till today, Nigeria has no respite from the
stronghold of Mr. Corruption.
Mr. Corruption seems to have the
upper hand from the presidential villa, through the 36 state houses, FCT head
quarters, and the 774 local government headquarters throughout Nigeria. Table 2
was used to demonstrate few examples of mismanagement and corruption, and there
may not be any need for an econometric analysis to prove that there is positive
correlation between corruption, mismanagement and reform failure in Nigeria.
The billions of dollars and
trillions of naira squandered over poverty alleviation programmes those hidden
in suite cases, and more put, away in foreign bank accounts, represent the money
needed to provide social amenities, employment and reduce poverty. The report
of Levi, et al (2007) over the Abacha looted funds goes to support the UN
report according to Nna, et al (2010) that Nigeria owns over $100billion of
$400 billion stolen by Africans and hidden away in foreign lands.
The mismanagement and inefficiency
of crude oil money at NNPC over the years remains “deplorable” as stated by the
Irekife Crude Oil Sales Tribunal (1981). This is a corporation responsible for
managing the revenue source of the nation, yet it remains the highest source of
leakage of natural resources.
The $2.2b arms deal of 2015 is among
the cases of public sector mismanagement, and nobody can be in doubt about why
poverty, hunger, anger, militancy and Boko Haram remain in Nigeria. Despite
modest growth in GDP between 2010 and 2012 there was no corresponding
development largely due to mismanagement.
At present about 60 percent of the
64 percent youth population is unemployed. This situation could have been arrested
if strategic industries like the Ajaokuta Steel Mills among others are working.
But today the “demons” are being blamed for abandoning such huge projects. But
the “demons” do not share money, rather corrupt political leaders, business
people and sundry others do.
When huge sums like N1.2trn
disappears among other billions of petro-dollars, there is no way the “demons”
would not be made the scapegoats, and there is no way poverty will not persist
in the land. With 67 million youths unemployed and absolute poverty rate
hovering around 62 percent in 2011 and the high level of corruption it may be
safe to state that mismanagement is the bane of reform failures in Nigeria.
This contribution supports the
thesis of Levi, et al (2007) that reforms hardly survive in a country without
the culture of integrity, transparency and accountability, which will help in
fighting all forms of corruption.
4.2.
Recommendations
i.
Good
policies should be retained by successive governments instead of scrapping them
and announcing new ones. This would make for continuity and arrest huge
financial wastages.
ii.
Duplication
of reforms often renders them ineffective. There was no distinctive difference
between the objective of OFN and Green Revolution. Policy makers’ need to
rethink issues before making announcement of programmes that would not see the
light of the day.
iii.
High
profile reform programmes like PTF should attract legislative backing to avoid
being easily discontinued by a new government that does not like the old one as
is often the case in Nigeria.
iv.
Heavy
Industrial Projects like the Steel Rolling Mills should be revived to create
more employment and enhance the GDP growth rate now at a very low level.
v.
The
estimated number of 67 million unemployed youths in Nigeria is too high. Government
should pay attention to heavy agricultural development that would provide
permanent jobs for the teaming youths instead of dishing out commercial
tricycles (Keke) to the youths as a form of youth empowerment.
4.3.
Scope for further study
Further study should attempt to
explore the relationship between corruption and reform failure to see if a
solution could be found to the syndrome in Nigeria.
5. CONCLUSION
This study explored qualitative data
that provided leading evidence to suggest that Nigeria is rich in pronouncing
reforms that are merely elegant on paper but weak through implementation
strategies.
Table 1 showed numerous programmes
for socio-economic development that failed to achieve the objectives for which
they were established, largely due to corruption and mismanagement.
Table 2 provided verifiable evidence
of corruption and mismanagement in Nigeria, thereby clearly answering the
research questions about the incidence of corruption and mismanagement in
Nigeria. Despite modest growth in GDP between 2010 and 2012 unemployment and
absolute poverty levels remain high due largely to corruption and blatant
mismanagement of huge public resources.
In furtherance of research on public
sector management, this study found robust positive relationship between
mismanagement and reform failures in Nigeria. This finding is not an
exaggeration because it finds favour with the views of Zimmerman (1994) that
curbing unethical behavior in government and mismanagement are necessary for
ensuring reform success and sustainability.
It also supports Levi, et al (2007)
that reforms cannot survive in a country well drenched in corruption and
mismanagement. The finding is also in tandem with the opinion of Campos and
Bhargava (2007) that reform success requires increased transparency and
accountability and a practical grip on combating corruption in all its
ramifications. This is the achievement of this critical investigation.
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