NATIONAL
CYBER SECURITY STRATEGIES: MANAGEMENT, UNIFICATION AND ASSESSMENT
Darius
Štitilis
Mykolas
Romeris University, Lithuania
E-mail: stitilis@mruni.eu
Irmantas
Rotomskis
Mykolas
Romeris University, Lithuania
E-mail: marius@laurinaitis.eu
Marius
Laurinaitis
Mykolas
Romeris University, Lithuania
E-mail: marius@laurinaitis.eu
Sergiy
Nadvynychnyy
Ternopil
National Economic University, Ukraine
E-mail: nsa2008@ukr.net
Nadiya
Khorunzhak
Ternopil
National Economic University, Ukraine
E-mail: n.khorunzhak@ukr.net
Submission: 8/21/2020
Revision: 9/04/2020
Accept: 9/05/2020
ABSTRACT
Cyber security has become an important issue both on the EU and the national level. Cyber security is now perceived as a part of national security. The newly emerging cyber security policy, comprising national cyber security strategies as an important constituent part, has been recently paid considerable attention. Speaking of national cyber security strategies, a positive thing is that the majority of EU member states have already approved such strategies. However, the approved strategies differ considerably in terms of their content and implementation. The present article aims at identifying reasons for differences in individual national strategies and analyses aspects of their unifications in expectation to find out an optimum balance between the degree of unification and the need to retain differences arising from intrinsic national singularities. To this end, the article analyses the issue of national cyber security on the basis of Lithuania's cyber security strategy as a sample in the context of ENISA good practices for the development of cyber security strategies and by application of ENISA developed KPIs and testing ENISA cyber security strategy evaluation tool. Finally, the article suggests recommendations on further development of national cyber security strategies in terms of their unification and national singularities.
Keywords: Cyber security; National cyber security strategy; Cyber security policy; Management
1.
INTRODUCTION
Cyber threats have become an issue of major concern both
on the national and international level. Scientific research emphasizes the
global nature of the cyber space predetermining the global character of the
possible threats. Because of the global character, investigation in cyber
incidents or attacks becomes complex and sometimes impossible. It has to be
noted though that cyber-attacks actually take place in a particular territory
and involve physical subjects located in a specific territory as well and are
committed by natural or legal persons subject to particular national
jurisdictions (SCHMITT, 2017). One may suggest to deal with the problem by
coordinating cyber security policies on the global/regional level; however, the
importance of national regulation in combating cyber threats may not be
neglected as well.
Development of the cyber security policy has been paid
considerable attention by the EU. In 2016, the EU adopted Directive (EU)
2016/1148 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 2016
concerning measures for a high common level of security of network and
information systems across the Union, which became a major instrument helping
unify cyber security policies of nation states. On 13 September 2017 the
Commission adopted a cybersecurity package.
The Cybersecurity Act, which has now entered into
force, lay at the core of the package. The changes this
new EU regulation brings about are twofold: a comprehensive reform
of ENISA and the creation of a certification framework (CYBER
SECURITY. EUROPEAN COMMISSION).
An important role in the development of the cyber
security policy is played by national cyber security strategies. The national
strategies are actually one of the measures to ensure cyber security.
Technologies and techniques, strategies and tactics, motives and ideologies,
rules and laws, institutions and industries, power and money - all of these
topics have a role to play in cybersecurity, and all of these are tightly
interwoven (TROPINA; CALLANAN, 2015).
National cyber security strategies are becoming more and
more important. Individual nation states invest significant efforts into
development of their cyber security strategies. At the moment, approved
national cyber security strategies may be found in all EU member states. The
situation may be well illustrated by ENISA cyber security strategy interactive
map, publicly available at (NATIONAL CYBER SECURITY STRATEGIES – INTERACTIVE
MAP. ENISA). The map includes objectives set in individual national strategies.
Already having looked at the objectives, one may spot differences in the
numbers and the content. In the following chapters, the article describes an
approach to national cyber security strategies as well as their unification and
national singularities.
2.
LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1.
Endeavors to coordinate cyber
security policies in combat against cyber attacks
Endeavours to combat cyber threats
now being made on the EU level. In 2013, the EU adopted European cyber security
strategy (AN OPEN, SAFE AND SECURE CYBERSPACE, 2013). The strategy aims at
making the EU digital environment the safest in the world and protecting major
values and freedoms. It sets five major objectives: I) to improve cyber
immunity, ii) to reduce the cybercrime rate, iii) to establish and further
develop a cyber-defence policy, iv) to build up industrial and technological
resources and v) to establish an international cyber space policy compliant
with core values of the EU.
The European cyber security strategy
was further extended by adopting several subsequent instruments:
· The European Agenda on Security (THE EUROPEAN AGENDA ON SECURITY, 2015)
with the purpose to help judicial authorities and law enforcement agencies to
respond to cybercrime, mainly by renewing policies and amending legal acts. The
agenda also set goals to identify obstacles for criminal investigations and
improve development of cyber capabilities.
· A Digital Single Market Strategy for Europe
(A CONTEST FOR EASTERN EUROPE, 2015) with the purpose to create better
opportunities to use digital products and services by means of creating proper
conditions to exploit the potential of the digital economy growth. To this end,
improvement of security, reliability and inclusion of the Internet is
essential.
· A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and
Security Policy 2016 with the purpose to strengthen the EU's role as a global
actor. Cyber security has become a major pillar in today’s commitment to cyber
development, cooperation with key partners and determination to deal with cyber
issues in all spheres of politics, including tackling disinformation by means
of strategic communication.
Issues of national cyber security
strategies are out of the scope of the aforementioned instruments. However, it
is important to note that the approach to cyber security and policy development
should be wider to comprise national security aspects and other dimensions
including disinformation and general threats.
One of the key binding
instruments is Network and Information Security directive of 2016, which laid
down fundamentals for cyber security systems in all EU member states, ranging from
standards of national cyber security strategies to the requirements for
national CERTs. In fact, the directive harmonizes the content of national cyber
security strategies.
First, the directive
lays down a general obligation for member states to introduce national cyber
security strategies. Second, the directive stipulates more explicit
requirements in Article 7: The national strategy on the security of network and
information systems primarily addresses the following issues:
a) the objectives and
priorities of the national strategy on the security of network and information
systems;
b) a governance framework
to achieve the objectives and priorities of the national strategy on the
security of network and information systems, including roles and responsibilities
of the government bodies and the other relevant actors;
c) the identification of
measures relating to preparedness, response and recovery, including cooperation
between the public and private sectors;
d) an indication of the
education, awareness-raising and training programmes relating to the national
strategy on the security of network and information systems;
e) an indication of the
research and development plans relating to the national strategy on the
security of network and information systems;
f) a risk assessment plan to identify risks;
g) a list of the various
actors involved in the implementation of the national strategy on the security
of network and information systems.
Member States may turn
to ENISA for advice and assistance when developing their national strategies.
As per article 7(3) Member States ought to communicate their national
strategies to the Commission within three months from their adoption
(MARKOPOULOU; KONSTANTINOU; DE HEART, 2019).
However, the directive
is not likely to explicitly regulate obligations of nations states in terms of
national cyber security strategies. In fact, the aforementioned obligations
leave nation states considerable freedom in the development of their national
cyber security strategies. Yet, according to the directive, at least key
requirements laid down in Article 7 must be followed.
The directive had to be
transposed into national law of EU members states by 2018. Most of the member
states have already transposed the directive into their legislation (NIS IMPLEMENTATION
TRACKER, 2020), mostly in 2018. Although
effective only for two years, the directive is already likely to yield positive
results. It has to be noted though that the correlation between cyber incidents
and the legal environment is difficult to evaluate, and it is not the object of
this study to research the causal links. However, speaking of the latter, the
statistics shows no decline in cyber risks (CYBERSECURITY
STATISTICS FOR 2020).
2.2.
National cyber security strategies
and their differences
So far, the creation and development of national cyber
security strategies have been little coordinated. The strategies considerably
differ in a range of aspects, including the key principles, goals, objectives
and specific implementation measures. Some of them contain principles, goals
and measures that are completely absent in strategies developed by other nation
states. Descriptions of the strategies also differ: some of them are very
explicit while others are much shorter, specifying in detail only, for example,
the principles and objective.
Differences may also be observed in other aspects, such
as the way of enforcement, legal status, termination, etc. Differences in
national cyber security strategies have been evidenced by scientific study as
well (ŠTITILIS; PAKUTINSKAS; MALINAUSKAITĖ, 2016). Reasons of the observed
differences vary. It may be the level of the state's maturity in the field
(SABILLON et al., 2016) or it may be predetermined by different understanding
of cyber security, specific national situations, etc.
At the moment, the process of adoption of the second or
even the third strategy may be observed among various nation states. However,
the newly adopted strategies still tend to retain considerable differences.
Thus, as differences between provisions of individual national strategies
remain, a uniform cyber security policy is still unlikely to emerge. Having in
mind the fact that cyber threats are often of an international nature, the
differences are likely to hinder development of a common regional or
international cyber security policy.
Harmonization of national cyber security strategies may
be insufficient as even on implementation of the directive provisions,
individual strategies are likely to retain significant differences.
However, certain differences among national cyber
security strategies may not be avoided as individual nation states may face
specific cyber threats. Along with conventional cyber threats, today's security
issues already include hybrid threats. For example, the Baltic states are
constantly facing adverse propaganda disseminated by Russia. Propaganda may
often be part of the so-called cyber war.
According to a recent study on hybrid threats, the
Russkiy Mir Foundation (RMF) is a cultural and educational institution that
promotes Russian language and culture across over 100 countries. RMF has
constructed a network of influencers among NATO nations, especially those
bordering the Russian Federation. Such organisations are capable of activity
which is hostile to the host nation and may contribute to cleavages in those
societies (HYBRID THREATS: A STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS PRESPECTIVE, 2019). Thus,
having in mind the wider context comprising national security aspects, such
threats should also be described in national cyber security strategies along
with relevant measures ensuring security of the cyber space.
Another example of specific threats may be observed in
countries generating nuclear power, which have to deal with specific safety
issues. Cyber threats are among possible threats in nuclear industry (NUCLEAR
ENERGY AND CURRENT SECURITY ENVIRONMENT IN TH AREA OF HYBRID THREATS, 2019), to
be considered on the national level. Certain electronically controlled nuclear
power systems include safety control systems, which may be targeted by cyber
attackers. Thus, issues of nuclear safety must be taken into consideration by
planners of cyber security measures even on the national scale.
Differences may also be associated with the development
and the state of the electronic communications infrastructure, singularities of
legal regulation, etc.
2.3.
ENISA's role in harmonization of
national cyber security strategies
ENISA’s work in supporting these strategies has focused
on the analysis of existing NCSS; on the development and implementation of
NCSS; on outlining and raising awareness of good practice to provide guidance
and practical tools to the Member States for evaluating their NCSS (VENUTI
TRANSLATION STRATEGY) To this end, ENISA provided recommendations or guidelines
for good practices of the development of national cyber security strategies. In
summary, it should be noted that most productive ENISA activities, in terms of
the provided recommendations/guidelines, took place in the period from 2012 to
2016. The list of ENISA activities is presented below.
Table 1: ENISA
recommendations/guidelines for national cyber security strategies
|
Name |
Year |
Description |
|
National Cyber
Security Strategy Good Practice Guide |
2012, 2016 |
This guide is
updating the different steps, objectives and good practices of the original
guide and analyses the status of NCSS in the European Union and EFTA area.
The aim is to support EU Member States in their efforts to develop and update
their NCSS. Therefore, the target audience of this guide are public officials
and policy makers. The guide also provides useful insights for the
stakeholders involved in the lifecycle of the strategy, such as private,
civil and industry stakeholders (NCSS GOOD PRACTICE GUIDE). |
|
National Cyber
Security strategies |
2012 |
The paper
includes a short analysis of the current status of cyber security strategies
within the European Union and elsewhere. It also identifies common themes and
differences, and concludes with a series of observations and recommendations.
The paper is based on the preliminary findings and analysis from an ENISA
project that is working to develop a Good Practice Guide on how to develop,
implement and maintain a national cyber security strategy (NATIONAL CYBER
SECURITY STRATEGIES). |
|
National Cyber
Security Strategies: An Implementation Guide |
2012 |
This report
introduces a set of concrete actions, which if implemented will lead to a
coherent and holistic national cyber-security strategy. It also proposes a
national cyber-security strategy lifecycle, with a special emphasis on the
development and execution phase. For each component of the strategy a list of
possible and indicative Key performance indicators (KPIs) will be described.
Senior policy makers will find practical recommendations on how to control
the overall development and improvement process and how to follow up on the
status of national cyber-security affairs within their country(NATIONAL CYBER
SECURITY STRATEGIES). |
|
2016 |
This guide is
updating the different steps, objectives and good practices of the original
guide and analyses the status of NCSS in the European Union and EFTA area.
The aim is to support EU Member States in their efforts to develop and update
their NCSS. Therefore, the target audience of this guide are public officials
and policy makers. The guide also provides useful insights for the
stakeholders involved in the lifecycle of the strategy, such as private,
civil and industry stakeholders (NCSS GOOD PRACTICE GUIDE). |
Source:
compiled by the authors
It can be stated that the aforementioned ENISA documents
considerably contributed to formation of good practices in national cyber
security strategies. However, as differences in national cyber security
strategies show, unification of the strategies is still insufficient. It is
very important for nation states to evaluate how specific strategies comply
with ENISA formed good practices. Such evaluation may be done by means of a
newly ENISA developed evaluation tool.
By 2018, ENISA created National Cyber Security Strategies
evaluation tool to help Member States evaluate their strategic priorities and
objectives related to National Cyber Security Strategies. The tool incorporated
fifteen objectives, developed and presented in the aforementioned guidelines of
2016:
· Develop national cyber
contingency plans
· Protect critical
information infrastructure
· Organise cyber security
exercises
· Establish baseline
security measures
· Establish incident
reporting mechanisms
· Raise user
awareness
· Strengthen training and
educational programmes
· Establish an incident
response capability
· Address cyber crime
· Engage in international
cooperation
· Establish a
public-private partnership
· Balance security with
privacy
· Institutionalise
cooperation between public agencies
· Foster R&D
· Provide incentives for
the private sector to invest in security measures.
The objective
of this investigation - to assess EU cyber security policy and the potential
for unifying national cyber security strategies.
3.
DATA AND
METHODOLOGY
In preparing this article
and presenting the outcomes of research, the authors used several methods,
including analysis of legal regulation related to cyber security strategies and
appropriate generalizations. The results of the comparative study of cyber
security strategies were used, and the ENISA tool for evaluating cyber security
strategies was analyzed.
The
authors also used a modelling method. Based on the ENISA cyber security
strategy evaluation tool, the situation was modelled in comparison with the
Lithuanian cyber security strategy model.
4. RESULTS
4.1.
National Cyber Security Strategies
evaluation tool: example evaluation of Lithuanian national cyber security
strategy
To illustrate how the evaluation tool actually works, we
chose an example of Lithuania's national cyber security strategy of 2018,
approved by Decision No 818 of the government of the Republic of Lithuania in
2018. Compared to equivalent cyber security strategies of other nation states
(which often are just a set of cyber security principles), the strategy is
actually an explicit and detailed document. The document is structured to
include key objectives and goals which may be described as follows:
Figure 1: Objectives and goals of
the national cyber security strategy of Lithuania
Source:
compiled by the authors
As the objectives and goals are planned explicitly and in
detail, the strategy may seem at the first sight to reflect of include all
ENISA good practice objectives and implementation recommendations. Analysis of
Lithuania's cyber security strategy may be good example to be followed by other
countries.
The explicit evaluation
of Lithuania's national cyber security strategy by means of the ENISA tool is
given below. The ENISA evaluation tool was used to mark all the 15 objectives
to be checked against criteria set in the ENISA model.
The results revealed that according to ENISA developed
tool, Lithuania's national cyber security strategy still retains many places to
be improved. The table below describes KPI`s (i.e. objectives) specifying if
the ENISA tool contains recommendations on each of the objectives[1].
Table 2: Recommendations
on specific objectives (present/absent)
|
Objective |
Are recommendations given? Yes/No |
|
Develop national cyber contingency plans |
Yes |
|
Protect
critical information infrastructure |
Yes |
|
Organise cyber security exercises |
Yes |
|
Establish baseline security measures |
Yes |
|
Establish incident reporting mechanisms |
Yes |
|
Raise user awareness |
Yes |
|
Strengthen training and educational programmes |
Yes |
|
Establish an incident response capability |
No |
|
Address cyber crime |
Yes |
|
Engage in international cooperation |
Yes |
|
Establish a public-private partnership |
Yes |
|
Balance security with privacy |
No |
|
Institutionalise cooperation between public agencies |
Yes |
|
Foster R&D |
Yes |
|
Provide incentives for the private sector to invest in security
measures |
No |
Source: compiled by the authors
Thus, only three areas
of Lithuania's national cyber security strategy may be deemed fully compliant
with ENISA good practice. Al the remaining areas were subject to certain
recommendations on incompletely implemented ENISA suggested good practices.
The experiment with
Lithuania's national cyber security strategy has revealed that despite being
explicit and detailed, the strategy may still contain areas to be improved, 12
of 15 objectives in this particular case. Although all the objectives may be
found in Lithuania's national cyber security strategy, their specific
description still needs to be improved and supplemented by additional measures.
However, it has to be
noted that the ENISA evaluation tool sets identical KPIs and evaluation
principles for all nation states. The method actually fails to evaluate if an
individual nation state identifies certain singularities in their cyber
security situation and if such singularities are considered in their cyber
security strategies. One may doubt if such technique is the right way to
evaluate individual cyber security strategies.
After all, nations
states can be different in a variety of aspects, ranging from the size,
population and financial capacities to introduce necessary safety measures to
specific cyber threats predetermined by exterior factors, geographical location
and cybercrime rate. How different the situation in the field of e-crime may be
can be observed in Eurobarometer data published in 2019 (EUROPEANS’ ATTITUDES
TOWARDS INTERNET SECURITY, 2019).
4.2.
The model of Lithuania's national
cyber security strategy
Prior to adoption of Lithuania's national cyber security
strategy, a model of Lithuania's national cyber security strategy was developed
(THE MODEL OF LITHUANIA'S NATIONAL CYBER SECURITY STRATEGY, 2017).
Among other questions, the model, designed specifically
for an individual country (Lithuania in this particular case), emphasizes the
necessity to take into account the national situation in Lithuania. In other words, a national cyber security
strategy must be developed in view of the specific national situation. In
Lithuania's case, the following key elements may be distinguished:
· cyber threats in
Lithuania in terms of the geopolitical situation;
· electronic public
services and e-business in Lithuania;
· legal environment,
including national programs and strategies in the field of IT security and
electronic data protection.
One of the specific
things that can be mentioned in Lithuania's case is the that some of its
critical infrastructure units are using SCADA information systems. The systems contain certain elements prone to
security risks, e.g. an opportunity to interfere with the security systems.
A good example may be
the Stuxnet case where a computer worm has been used against Iran's nuclear
program. Thus, the use of such systems, particularly in a critical
infrastructure, incurs specific cyber security risks, which have to be taken
into consideration when developing a national cyber security strategy. It is
attributable to national singularities as SCADA systems are mostly used in
Eastern European countries.
It has to be noted
though, that the aforementioned elements identified in Lithuania's case may
coincide with, be similar to or essentially differ from elements describing
national singularities of other countries and may depend on political, economic
and cultural factors.
In our opinion, it is
essential for the developers of national cyber security strategies to take into
consideration national singularities of individual nation states. The national
singularities should also be included into ENISA KPIs and the ENISA evaluation
tool. This would help nation states to develop adequate cyber security
strategies suitable for their individual situations.
Further research might
focus on the development of methodologies suitable for identification of
singularities of individual nation states in the context of cyber security so
as to allow evaluation of the needs and development of cyber security systems
actually responding to the real situation and real cyber threats.
5. CONCLUSIONS
While issues of cyber
security are quite explicitly coordinated on the EU level, regulation of national
cyber security strategies is still minimal. National cyber security systems
should undergo unification in view of the fact that cyber security threats
often go beyond the boundaries of national borders and are, generally speaking,
global, presenting essentially similar challenges to all nation states.
Legal regulation should
be further developed on the EU level or on the level of recommendations so as
to uniform national cyber security strategies, which have a significant impact
both on the situation in the national cyber security and on safeguarding cyber
security on the regional or international level.
However, unification of
national cyber security strategies is still subject to certain restraints, that
is they have to reflect inevitable national singularities. To put it other way,
the strategies should also focus on national singularities identified by nation
states alone. Although cyber threats are essentially of an international
nature, national singularities, such as the geopolitical location, the
developed electronic communications infrastructure, the national legal
environment, etc., may have a significant role in ensuring cyber security and
thus have to be reflected in the national cyber security strategy.
Good practices provided
by ENISA for the development of national cyber security strategies have to put
a greater emphasis on differences between individual strategies, predetermined
by national singularities. Moreover, ENISA National Cyber Security Strategies
evaluation tool should also comprise national singularities which may be
important for cyber security situation in a particular country. Thus, the
methodology of ENISA evaluation tool should also be improved.
Modern high quality
national cyber security strategies capable of dealing with today’s cyber
threats are only viable by additionally highlighting national singularities
attributable to a cyber-security situation in a particular nation state.
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